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ABSTRACT
This thesis studies identification and testability for three models of choice under
uncertainty. Identification is concerned with whether the parameters of a specified
model are uniquely recoverable from observable behavior. Testability is concerned
with how to test the consistency between the model’s predictions and choice data. All
models considered deviate from classic models in one of two ways: either randomness
in preference varies with decision problems, or preferences violate expected utility
theory.
Chapter 1 studies a model of rational inattention. An agent can acquire costly in-
formation about uncertain states of the world before choosing an action from a menu.
The choice of information depends on the menu of actions and is assumed unobserv-
able. Due to the unobservability of private information, the choice of action appears
random from an outside analyst’s perspective. I show that, given only stochastic
choice from menus of actions, an analyst can identify the agent’s risk attitude, prior
belief, and information cost function.
Chapter 2 studies an instance of the classic question of whether preference can be






the distribution of risk preferences is identifiable from random choice of lotteries. It is
known that the answer is a rmative under random expected utility. I show that such
uniqueness fails if risk preferences are not restricted a priori to conform to expected
utility, for instance, if they are assumed to conform only to weighted utility. I discuss
the reason for such non-uniqueness and argue that uniqueness may be restored if data
includes the joint distributions of choice across a limited number of feasible sets.
Chapter 3 studies how to test non-expected utility theory given that data contain
only finitely many observations on choice of lottery. While consistency of data with
expected utility has been thoroughly studied in the literature, I derive conditions
on data that are both necessary and su cient for consistency with maximization of
a betweenness preference. The conditions employ novel geometric arguments and
provide a more stringent test than what is used in the experimental literature, which
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Chapter 1




We consider a decision maker who can acquire costly information about uncertain
states of the world before choosing an action from a menu. The choice of action is
observable, but the choice of information is not. Due to the unobservability of private
information, choice from menus appears random from an outside analyst’s point of
view. We ask if an analyst can infer the agent’s prior belief, taste (risk attitude), and
information cost function from her stochastic choice behavior. We also determine the
exhaustive behavioral implications of the model.
Our model is built on the classic framework of Anscombe and Aumann (1963).
Uncertainty is captured by an objective state space, and each action, called an act,
yields a state-dependent payoff. Given a finite set of feasible acts, called a menu, the
agent follows a two-step decision process. First, she decides what to learn about the
unknown state of nature by maximizing the expected benefit of improved choice of
act minus the cost of information. Then, given the realized information signal, she
updates her belief about the uncertain state and chooses an act from the menu to
maximize her expected utility. As a result, the probability that an act is chosen is at
most the probability that this act is assigned the highest expected utility under the
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acquired information.
We take stochastic choice from menus as the primitive, and show that it is sufficient
for identifying the key elements of the model. Theorem 1.1 states that stochastic
choice identifies the prior belief uniquely, and identifies the cardinal utility index
uniquely. Theorem 1.2 states that, while the information cost function may not
be unique, the smallest one consistent with the observed stochastic choice can be
identified. In addition, the cost is uniquely identified for any information structure
that is optimal for some menu.
The smallest information cost function is shown to equal the convex conjugate of
the ex-ante value function of the information acquisition problem. Notably, we prove
that the ex-ante valuation of a menu can be computed from the observed random
choice of act. Consequently, we can identify all the parameters of the model as if we
have the ex-ante ranking of menus.
The key feature of our model is that private information is both endogenous and
menu-dependent. This distinguishes our model from random utility models, where the
randomness of preference is assumed a priori to be fixed, hence menu-independent.
This difference is reflected in differing behavioral predictions. One implication for
behavior stemming from menu-independence is Monotonicity, meaning that an option
in a given menu is more likely to be chosen when that menu becomes smaller. This
is because a given option is more likely to be optimal when it competes with fewer
alternatives. Clearly, this intuition requires that the randomness of preference does
not vary with the menu. In our model, the choice of information generally depends
on the entire menu. Hence Monotonicity can be violated when the agent acquires
different information when the menu gets smaller.
We point out two behavioral implications of our model which are jointly weaker
than Monotonicity. Independence of Never Chosen Act (INCA) states that if an act
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is never chosen from a given menu regardless of the private signal, then removing
this act will not change the choice probabilities of all other acts in that menu. The
intuition is that, if an act is never chosen then it does not contribute to the expected
benefit of the underlying information. Hence removing it will not affect the optimal
choice of information, and with information structure unchanged, the choice of acts
remains the same. Constant Improvement (CI) states that if we increase the payoff
of an act in every state by the same amount in terms of utility, then it will be chosen
more frequently. Note that with menu-independent private information, an act is
chosen more frequently whenever its payoff increases in every state. In our model, it
can be true that an improved act is chosen less frequently, unless the increment in
payoff is a constant across the states. Unlike INCA, CI does not require the choice of
information to be unchanged. Hence it provides a connection between choices from
two menus with potentially different underlying information.
Since the agent is assumed to be an expected utility maximizer, our model includes
random expected utility model as a special case.1 A behavioral implication of that
model is Linearity, which requires that, for example, the probability of choosing
λf + (1 − λ)h over λg + (1 − λ)h is the same as the probability of choosing f over
g.2 Linearity is violated in our model. This is because the choice of information for
the mixed menu {λf + (1 − λ)h, λg + (1 − λ)h} depends on the magnitude of the
common mixing weight λ, though it does not depend on the common mixing act h.
Therefore, in this example, our model has a weaker implication, called Independence
of Degenerate Decision (IDD), which only requires that the probability of choosing
λf + (1− λ)h over λg + (1− λ)h does not depend on h.
1See Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) and Lu (2016) for random expected utility models. The former
studies choice of lotteries and the latter studies choice of acts. Their models assume that the
information about uncertainty is fixed. Our model reduces to Lu’s model if all but one information
structures are too costly to be acquired for any menu.
2Linearity is analogous to the independence axiom of expected utility over lotteries.
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We also prove a characterization result. Provided that the induced ranking over
menus has a rationally inattentive representation as in de Oliveira et al. (2017), we find
additional necessary and sufficient conditions for stochastic choice to be rationalized
by our model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
demonstrates how to recover the value of menus. Section 4 addresses the identification
problems. Section 5 discusses the novel behavioral implications of the model. In
particular, the model is distinguishable behaviorally from the exogenous information
special case (Lu, 2016). Section 6 discusses different types of data used to recover
information costs and the observability of our data. The characterization result is
confined to Appendix B. The most proofs are contained in Appendix A.
1.1.2 Literature Review
By rational inattention, we mean that an agent pays attention to only some infor-
mation relevant to her decision problem by balancing the benefits and the costs of
information. In many papers, modelers take an information cost function as known
and derive its implications (Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2009; Matějka, 2016; Boy-
aci and Akçay, 2018). In particular, costs are often assumed to take some specific
functional form, for example, an entropy-based cost function as in Sims (2003). Here,
we take behavior as given and ask what can we learn about the underlying informa-
tion costs. As a starting point, we assume a rich dataset and study identification of
information costs in this ideal setting.
There is a considerable related work in decision theory, also studying the relation-
ship between observed choice and unobserved private information. Table 1 classifies
those papers from two angles. First, information is either exogenous and fixed across
menus, or endogenous and varying with menus. Second, information is elicited from
either choice between menus, or choice from menus.
5
Choice between menus Choice from menus
Exogenous
information structure




de Oliveira et al. (2017)
Caplin and Dean (2015),
Ellis (2018),
This paper
Table 1.1: Related Literature
Lu (2016) studies how to identify private information through random choice from
menus, assuming that the information does not vary with menus. He demonstrates
how to evaluate menus via random choice. We prove that his approach for evaluating
menus also works under rational inattention. Then a more general identification
result follows. Specifically, we are able to identify the information cost function
through random choice, including the identification of a fixed information structure
as a special case. In terms of behavioral implications, we argue that Monotonicity
is the key axiom distinguishing our model from Lu’s. That is, once this axiom is
imposed, our model is reduced to Lu’s. In other words, Monotonicity is strong enough
to eliminate rational inattention in our setting.
Dillenberger et al. (2014) propose a model where an agent has access to a fixed in-
formation structure, and ranks menus in anticipation of arrival of information. They
show that information can be elicited from preference over menus. de Oliveira et al.
(2017) study a more general model where an agent ranks menus in anticipation of
costly information acquisition afterwards, and they demonstrate how to elicit in-
formation costs from menu-choice data only. While they leave choice from menus
unmodeled, our paper complements their work by connecting ex-post random choice
from menus to ex-ante ranking over menus. Once such connection is established, we
can obtain identification and characterization results based on their work.
Caplin and Dean (2015) and Ellis (2018) also study choice from menus with ratio-
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nal inattention. They both consider state-dependent choice data; that is, data take
the form: “when the realized state of nature is s, then (stochastic) choice from menus
is ...” By contrast, our choice data is unconditional and the realized state is not
assumed to be observed by the analyst. For given menus, if the frequencies of the
states are also observed, then state-dependent choice data are richer than uncondi-
tional choice data since the latter can be derived from the former. By exploiting this
richness, Caplin and Dean (2015) develop a revealed preference test for the rational
inattention model given state-dependent stochastic choice data on choices from an
arbitrary finite number of menus. Our identification and characterization results rely
only on unconditional stochastic choice, but, as is common in axiomatic modeling,
we need choice from a large number of menus to be observed. We leave for future
research the practical question of performing inference given stochastic choice from
only a limited number of menus.
All the papers in Table 1 assume objective uncertainty. There are also several
papers considering subjective uncertainty, and they can be classified similarly. Under
menu-independent randomness in taste, Dekel et al. (2001) study preference between
menus of lotteries and Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) study random choice of lotteries.
Ahn and Sarver (2013) combine these two types of behavior and propose a model
where an agent first chooses between menus and then chooses from the previously
chosen menu. Ergin and Sarver (2010) study choice between menus in anticipation
of costly contemplation, which means learning about uncertain taste.
Hyogo (2007) assumes objective uncertainty, but the behavior assumed observable
in his model is outside the scope of Table 1. He takes preference over pairs of actions
and menus of acts as the primitive. Each action is understood as an experiment. The
analyst does not observe the set of possible signals and the corresponding likelihood
function, but derives them from the choice behavior. In his representation, each
7
action is identified with a distribution over beliefs over the objective state space.
1.2 The Model
1.2.1 Framework
There is a finite state space S and a finite set of prizes X. Let ∆X be the probability
simplex of X, interpreted as the set of lotteries over the prizes. Each choice object is
an Anscombe-Aumann act, a mapping f : S → ∆X. Let F be the set of all acts. A
menu is a finite set of acts F ⊂ F . Let K be the set of all menus. When there is no
risk of confusion, an act which yields p ∈ ∆X in every state s is denoted by p, and a
singleton menu {f} is denoted by f .
For α ∈ [0, 1] and acts f, g ∈ F , αf + (1−α)g denotes the act such that for every
s ∈ S, (αf + (1−α)g)(s) = αf(s) + (1−α)g(s). For menus F,G ∈ K, αF + (1−α)G
denotes the menu {αf + (1− α)g : f ∈ F, g ∈ G}.
We are concerned with a decision maker who makes stochastic choices from menus.
The choice from a menu is modeled as a probability distribution over the collection
of all nonempty subsets of that menu. Formally, the decision maker is characterized
by a random choice correspondence, defined as follows.
Definition 1.1. A random choice correspondence (RCC), denoted by ρ∗, is a collec-
tion of probability measures {ρ∗F ∈ ∆(2F \ ∅) : F ∈ K}.
Interpret ρ∗F (A) as the probability that A equals the set of all optimal acts in
F . Implicitly, it is assumed that an analyst observes indifference between acts. If
ρ∗F is degenerate for every F , then an RCC is a choice correspondence as in classic
deterministic choice theory.3 Note that if two acts f and g are both optimal in a given
menu, then a deterministic choice correspondence is silent about which one will be
3As pointed out in Barberá and Pattanaik (1986), an RCC can be viewed as a generalization of a
deterministic choice correspondence that expresses agnosticism about tie-breaking. We discuss the
observability of RCC in Section 6.
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chosen. Similarly, we may not be able to pin down the exact probability distribution
of choice from an RCC.
Consider the following example. Suppose that F = {f1, f2, f3} and ρ∗F (f1) =
ρ∗F (f2) = ρ
∗
F ({f2, f3}) = 13 . Then f2 is chosen with probability at least
1
3
, as this is
the probability that f2 is the unique optimal act. On the other hand, f2 is chosen with
probability at most 2
3
because this is the probability that f2 is optimal. In general,
the probability of choosing f2 depends on how the agent breaks tie when f2 and f3
are both optimal. When the tie-breaking rule is not specified, we can only conclude





In general, though an RCC may fail to specify the exact probability that some
act in A is chosen from F , it does pin down an upper bound for this probability.
Definition 1.2. A collection of set functions {ρF : 2F \ ∅ → [0, 1]}F∈K, denoted
by ρ, is called an upper probability of choice (UPC) if there exists a random choice





Thus ρF (A) is the probability that some acts in A are optimal given the menu F .
If the agent always chooses from A whenever some acts in A are optimal, then the
likelihood of choosing from A is maximized. Hence, ρF (A) is also the largest proba-
bility that the chosen act is in A. On the other hand, if the agent never chooses from
A unless all optimal acts lie in A, then the likelihood of choosing from A is minimized.
Thus the corresponding smallest probability is
∑
B⊂A ρ
∗(B) = 1− ρF (Ac), the prob-
ability that no act in Ac is optimal. In sum, ρ conveys interval-valued probabilistic
predictions for choice: the probability that the chosen act from F is in A can be any
number in the interval [1− ρF (Ac), ρF (A)], depending on how the agent breaks tie.4
4The lower bound 1 − ρF (Ac), viewed as a function of A, is also called a belief function. It can






We take an RCC ρ∗ as the primitive, and then construct the UPC ρ by (1.1).
The analysis below mainly focuses on ρ. This is without loss of generality, since
there is a one-to-one correspondence between RCCs and UPCs. In fact, there is an
alternative way to define ρ, without evoking ρ∗ in advance. A UPC ρ is such that for







for every positive integer n and every collection {A1, · · · , An} ⊂ 2F .5 Then we can





This ρ∗ is the unique RCC satisfying (1.1).6 Consequently, RCCs and UPCs are
equivalent representations for random choice.
1.2.2 Rational Inattention Choice Model
A rational inattention choice model describes a two-stage decision process. Facing a
menu, a decision maker first selects an information structure in order to learn about
the unknown state of nature. After receiving the information signal, she chooses an
act from the menu.
Let ∆S denote the set of all probability measures over S. The decision maker
is endowed with a prior belief p̄ ∈ ∆S. Formally, an information structure is a
random variable with a state-dependent distribution. After seeing the realization of
this random variable, the decision maker updates her prior belief by Bayes’ rule.
5ρF : 2
F → [0, 1] is a normalized capacity if ρF (∅) = 0, ρF (F ) = 1, and A ⊂ B ⇒ ρF (A) ≤ ρF (B)
for all A,B ∈ 2F . This alternative definition of UPC follows from Shafer (1976, Theorem 2.1).
6See Shafer (1976, Theorem 2.2).
10
We assume that the decision maker is an expected utility maximizer. Let u :
∆X → R be her affine utility function. Given belief p ∈ ∆S, the decision maker
derives utility p · (u ◦ f) from act f , where




Since only the posterior belief matters for her choice, without loss of generality we
model an information structure as a probability distribution over beliefs. Bayesian
updating implies that the expected posterior equals the prior. Let ∆(∆S) denote the
set of all probability measures over ∆S. Then, the set of all information structures
is given by
Π(p̄) :=





Information is costly, and we measure cost in utils. Formally, the decision maker
faces an information cost function c : Π(p̄)→ [0,∞].
A rational inattention choice model is a tuple (u, p̄, c). The rationalizability of a
UPC is defined as follows.
Definition 1.3. A UPC ρ is rationalized by a rational inattention choice model
(u, p̄, c) if for every menu F ∈ K there exists







p · (u ◦ f)π(dp)− c(π)
 (1.2)
such that
ρF (A) = πF
{
p ∈ ∆(S) : A ∩ arg max
f ′∈F
p · (u ◦ f ′) 6= ∅
}
(1.3)
for every A ⊂ F .
Condition (1.2) states that when facing menu F , the decision maker first selects
an information structure to maximize the expected utility gain from that menu minus
11
the information cost.7 Note that she perfectly understands how her later choice from
the menu depends on the realized signal. Condition (1.3) states that the largest
probability that some act in A ⊂ F is chosen is exactly the probability that the
realized posterior belief values some act in A higher than all other acts in F .
If ρ is rationalized by (u, p̄, c), it is rationalized also by (αu+ β, p̄, αc+ γ), where
α > 0, β, γ ∈ R. Since X is finite, we can normalize u such that
max
x∈X
u(x) = 1 and min
x∈X
u(x) = 0.




We assume u and c are normalized throughout the paper, unless otherwise stated.
We also assume that c is proper (i.e., c(π) <∞ for some π) and lower-semicontinuous
to ensure that the maximization problem in (1.2) has a solution. Later, we will show
that it is without loss of generality to assume the following three additional properties
for c.
Definition 1.4. An information cost function c : Π(p̄) → [0,∞] is canonical if it
satisfies the following properties:
1. c(p̄) = 0.
2. If π1 is Blackwell more informative than π2, then c(π1) ≥ c(π2).8
3. c is convex.
First, if the decision maker does not acquire any information, she pays no cost.
Second, as a more informative information structure always yields a higher expected
7The optimal information structure in (1.2) is not unique for all menus in general, but it is unique
generically in the space of menus under a suitable metric. See Lemma B5 in Appendix.







all convex functions φ : ∆S → R. An equivalent definition is that π1 can be attained by performing




maxf∈F p · (u ◦ f)π1(dp) ≥
∫
∆S
maxf∈F p · (u ◦ f)π2(dp), since the integrand is a convex
function in p.
12
utility gain from any menu, it is more costly. Third, c is convex. The intuition for
convexity is that if the decision maker randomizes between π1 and π2 with probability
α and 1 − α respectively, she attains the same expected utility gain as acquiring
απ1 + (1 + α)π2 directly and pays cost αc(π1) + (1 − α)c(π2) on average. Thus
c(απ1 + (1 + α)π2) should not be higher than this amount; otherwise the decision
maker can simply randomize between π1 and π2 by herself.
We will show (Theorem 2) that if ρ is rationalized by (u, p̄, c), then there exists a
canonical cost function ĉ such that (u, p̄, ĉ) rationalizes ρ. Hence it is without loss of
generality to focus on canonical information cost functions.
1.3 Indirect Utility of Menus
Given a UPC ρ, suppose that it is rationalized by a rational inattention choice model
(u, p̄, c). The identification problem asks if we can, and how to, uniquely pin down the
parameters (u, p̄, c)? In this section, we demonstrate the key step for identification:
recovering ex-ante valuation of a menu from the stochastic choice ρ.
Let x̄ and x denote best and worst prizes respectively; that is, ρ{x̄,x}(x̄) = ρ{x,x}(x) =
1 for all x ∈ X. Note that they can be found through the choice from binary menus
of prizes. For each a ∈ [0, 1], fa denotes the constant act aδx + (1 − a)δx̄, where
δx ∈ ∆(X) assigns probability 1 to x. We call fa a test act.
Given a menu F , view ρF∪fa(F ) as a function of a. Following Lu (2016), call
it the test function of F . If a = 0, then ρF∪fa(F ) = 0 as f
a dominates all acts in
F ; if a = 1, then ρF∪fa(F ) = 1 as f
a is dominated by all acts in F . Moreover, it
can be shown that ρF∪fa(F ) is non-decreasing in a. Thus it behaves almost like a
distribution function.9
9In general, ρF∪fa(F ) may not be right-continuous in a. The discontinuity is due to the non-
uniqueness of optimal information structures. At any discontinuity point â, the agent can break the
tie in information choice in an arbitrary way, and so ρF∪f â(F ) can be any number in between the
left and the right limits.
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The following lemma shows that the indirect utility of a menu equals the integral
of its test function. Thus we can identify the decision maker’s valuation of menus
through stochastic choice.
Lemma 1.1. If a UPC ρ is rationalized by a rational inattention model (u, p̄, c), then
for all menus F ∈ K,
1∫
0







p · (u ◦ f)π(dp)− c(π)
 . (1.4)
Sketch of proof. The proof is based on the envelope theorem in Milgrom and Segal
(2002, Theorem 1 and 2). We provide a sketch of the proof here. See the details in
Appendix. Let V : K → R denote the value function of the information acquisition
problem in (1.2). Fixing a menu F , view V (F ∪ fa) as a function of a. We first argue
that we can express V (F ∪ fa) as the integral of its derivative:





V (F ∪ f t)dt.
By the envelope theorem,
d
da






p · (u ◦ f)πF∪fa(dp)
when both derivatives exist, where πF∪fa is an optimal information structure for
F ∪ fa satisfying (1.3). Then argue that both derivatives exist almost everywhere.
Note that when computing the right-hand side, the information structure is assumed







p · (u ◦ f)πF∪fa(dp) = ρF∪fa(F )− 1.
As a result,




Since f 1 is the worst act, V (F ∪f 1) = V (F ), and since f 0 is the best act, V (F ∪f 1) =
14




When private information is menu-independent, ρF∪fa(F ) is the probability that
when facing F , the agent derives utility at least 1−a. Thus, ρF∪fa(F ) can be viewed as
the distribution function for utility from F . By integrating this distribution function,
we can recover the expected utility from F . However, the above reasoning fails when
private information is menu-dependent. But since information is optimally acquired
in our model, an envelope theorem applies. For a small change in a, information
choice has no effect on the change in the value of F ∪ fa. Consequently, stochastic
choice is related to the derivatives of the indirect utility function in a way as if the
private information were fixed.10
1.4 Identification
In this section, assume that ρ is rationalized by a rational inattention choice model
(u, p̄, c). We demonstrate how to identify (u, p̄, c) from ρ.
1.4.1 Utility Function and Prior Belief
Theorem 1.1. Suppose that ρ is rationalized by (u, p̄, c) and (v, p̄′, c′). Then p̄ = p̄′
and u = αv + β for some α > 0 and β ∈ R.
Proof. Define a preference relation % over the set of all acts such that







Recall that for every π ∈ Π(p̄), the expected posterior belief equals the prior p̄. Hence,∫
∆S
p · (u ◦ f)π(dp) = p̄ · (u ◦ f) for all π and f . By Lemma 1.1, we have for all act
10The expected-utility preference and the additive separability of the objective function are both
crucial assumptions for the recoverability of indirect utility. Without them, an envelope theorem
may still apply so that the change in the indirect utility could still be evaluated as if the information
were fixed. But it would not be related to the stochastic choice in the same way.
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f ∈ F ,
1∫
0
ρf∪fa(f)da = V (f) = p̄ · (u ◦ f).
Thus% has a subjective expected utility representation (u, p̄) as in a standard Anscombe-
Aumann framework. It is well-known that belief p̄ is uniquely determined, and utility
function u is unique up to a linear transformation.
Theorem 1.1 shows that prior belief and taste are uniquely identified through
stochastic choice. Moreover, it is obvious from the proof that choices from binary
menus are sufficient for this identification.
1.4.2 Information Cost Function
In this subsection we assume that (u, p̄) is given, and study what can we infer about
the information cost function c through stochastic choice.
























Fixing π, this inequality holds for all F . Thus it still holds if we take supremum over
F on the right-hand side. Then we can construct a lower bound for c(π), denoted by













Then c(π) ≥ ĉ(π) for all π ∈ Π(p̄). It turns out that, ĉ is not just a lower bound for
the true cost function c. It is canonical and also rationalizes ρ given u and p̄.
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Theorem 1.2. Suppose that ρ is rationalized by (u, p̄, c). Let ĉ : Π(p̄) → [0,∞] be
given by (1.5). Then the following statements are true:
1. ĉ is canonical, and c(π) ≥ ĉ(π) for all π ∈ Π(p̄).
2. ρ is rationalized by (u, p̄, ĉ).
3. For every π ∈ Π(p̄), if there exists a menu F such that







p · (u ◦ f)π′(dp)− c(π′)
 ,
then ĉ(π) = c(π).
Theorem 1.2 says that we can identify the smallest information cost function ratio-
nalizing the stochastic choice. This cost function is canonical, even though the actual
cost function may not be. Thus, assuming a canonical information cost function is
without loss of generality. This also means that monotonicity in Blackwell infor-
mativeness and convexity are irrefutable properties. Furthermore, if an information
structure is optimal for some menu, then its cost is uniquely identified.
de Oliveira et al. (2017) also have an identification result for information cost
functions, but with different primitives. They take the ex-ante ranking over menus
as the observable, which gives the value function of information acquisition problem
through certainty equivalence: V (F ) = u(xF ) if F ∼ {xF}. From the value function,
recovering the information cost function is straightforward (by convex conjugacy).
A contribution of our paper is establishing the link between stochastic choice from
menus, our primitive, and ex-ante preference over menus. Thus, given stochastic
choice, we can make inference as if we have menu-choice data.
Note that in de Oliveira et al. (2017) a unique canonical information cost function
is obtained, while we identify only the smallest cost function. This is due to the
following difference between the two settings: they assume unbounded utility, i.e.
17
u(X) is unbounded, but we do not.11 We do not have such unboundedness because
we assume that X is finite. A finite X ensures the existence of the best and the worst
acts. Then we define the test function based on those acts. However, even if X is
infinite, our approach still works. Given a menu F , we can use the best and the worst
possible prizes in F to construct the test function of F .12
The cost function ĉ is constructed under the assumption that choices from all
menus are observed. If the dataset is limited, what can we say about the information
cost function? The following proposition provides a partial answer.













Suppose we observe stochastic choice from all menus containing n+ 1 or less acts.
Then we know ρF∪fa for all a ∈ [0, 1] and all F with |F | ≤ n. Proposition 1.1 says
that, in this situation, we can identify the cost of each information structure with at
most n possible realizations. The intuition of the proof is the following. For example,
suppose π leads to only 2 possible posteriors and G = {g1, g2, g3}. Then it must
be true that under π, there exists one act in G, say g1, which is never the unique




maxg∈G p · (u ◦ g)π(dp) =
∫
∆S





ρG∪fa(G)da because a smaller menu has lower valuation.
Hence, the supremum in (1.5) can be achieved by a menu with 2 or less acts.
11Consider an information structure π with finite cost. No matter how high is its cost, as u(X)
is unbounded, there are menus for which π is still valuable. Indeed, there exist menus for which π
is optimal. This comes from the duality between the space of menus and the space of information
structures. Therefore, as argued in Theorem 1.2, the cost of π can be uniquely identified.
12Recall that each menu is finite, and an act is a mapping from a finite state space to the
set of lotteries with finite support. Thus given any menu F , the set ∪f∈F,s∈S{x ∈ X : x ∈
the support of f(s)} is finite. We can find the worst and the best outcomes in this set.
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1.4.3 Comparative Information Costs
The recoverability of the value of menus allows as to compare two agents with different
information cost functions. Suppose we observe two rationalizable UPCs ρ1 and ρ2.
Let f i,a denote test act for ρi. Say that ρ2 reveals higher information cost than ρ1 if
whenever ρ2 induces higher ex-ante value for menu F than for act f , so does ρ1.
Definition 1.5. Say that ρ2 reveals higher information cost than ρ1 if, for all f ∈ F
and F ∈ K,
V2(F ) ≥ V2({f})⇒ V1(F ) ≥ V1({f}), (1.6)
where Vi(F ) =
∫ 1
0
ρiF∪f i,a(F )da for all F ∈ K and i = 1, 2.
Based on Lemma 1.1, we can interpret the integral of the test function of a menu
as lottery equivalent. To see this, let αiF =
∫ 1
0
ρF∪f i,a(F )da. Then agent i ranks F
the same as the constant act, αiF δx̄i + (1− αiF )δxi , where x̄i and xi are the best and
worst outcomes for this agent.
Thus condition (1.6) can be interpreted as follows. If agent 2 values menu F higher
than menu {f}, then so does agent 1. If we take F = {g}, then (1.6) implies that
both agents rank any pair of singleton menus in the same way. Since information is
irrelevant for singleton menus, two agents must have the same prior belief and taste.
In particular, they share the same best and worst outcomes. Then (1.6) implies
further that whenever agent 2 values menu F higher than constant act fa, so does
agent 1. If they have the same information, then they would rank menus identically.
Therefore, the difference in their revealed rankings of menus can be attributed to a
difference in their choices of information. This suggests that agent 1 would be able
to acquire better information to improve choice from F , which implies that agent 1
faces lower information costs.
Let ĉi be the minimal information cost function for ρ
i, given by (1.5). The fol-
lowing proposition says that ρ2 reveals higher information cost than ρ1 if and only if
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ĉ2 ≥ ĉ1.
Theorem 1.3. Suppose that ρ1 and ρ2 are both rationalizable. Then the following
statements are equivalent:
1. ρ2 reveals higher information cost than ρ1.
2. V1(F ) ≥ V2(F ) for all F ∈ K, and V1({f}) = V2({f}) for all f ∈ F .
3. u1 = u2, p̄1 = p̄2, and ĉ1 ≤ ĉ2.
Here, Vi(F ) =
∫ 1
0
ρiF∪f i,a(F )da for all F ∈ K and i = 1, 2.
Note that for any rationalizable ρ,
1∫
0
ρF∪f t∪fa(F ∪ f t)da =
t∫
0
ρF∪f t∪fa(F ∪ f t)da+
1∫
t




ρF∪fa(F )da+ 1− t.






ρ2F∪fa(F )da ∀ F ∈ K and t ∈ [0, 1]. (1.7)
Therefore, (1.7) says that the test function of F under ρ2 second-order stochastically
dominates the test function of F under ρ1.13 In a model where the information struc-
ture is exogenous and fixed for all menus, Lu (2016) uses this condition to characterize
that one agent has more information than another agent. Our result shows that the
same condition has a broader implication in a more general model. Intuitively, a
decision maker who faces a lower information cost function is able to acquire more
information. Hence she enjoys higher indirect utility from every menu.
13Although a test function needs not be right-continuous, it has only countably many points of




In this section, we discuss the behavioral implications of our model. Note that if we
assume c to be such that c(π) = 0 if π = π̂ and c(π) =∞ otherwise, then our model
is reduced to a random expected utility model with menu-independent information
structure π̂. A random expected utility model has several behavioral implications
which are no longer true in our model in general. We discuss what are the weaker
implications.
1.5.1 Implications of menu-dependent private information
A random utility model postulates that an agent has a random preference with a
fixed probability distribution. This is true, for example, for random expected utility
(Gul and Pesendorfer, 2006) and random subjective expected utility (Lu, 2016). An
important behavioral implication of that model is Monotonicity:
Monotonicity: ρ∗F (A) ≤ ρ∗F\B(A \B) ∀ B,A, F ∈ K with A ⊂ F and A \B 6= ∅.
Monotonicity reflects the fact that, fixing a preference relation, if A is the set of all
optimal acts in F , then A \ B is the set of all optimal acts in F \ B. Monotonicity
also implies that,14
ρG(A) ≤ ρF (A) for all A ⊂ F ⊂ G.
That is, the maximal probability that some act in A is chosen cannot increase when
new acts are added into the menu. This captures the intuition that, when a menu
becomes larger then an act is less likely to be optimal since it is compared with more
acts. However, with rational inattention, Monotonicity can be violated.
Consider the following example. Let π be an information structure which only
14The converse is not true. For example, let F = {f, h} and G = {f, g, h}. Suppose that ρ∗F (f) = 12




G({h, g}) = 12 . Then Monotonicity is violated
because ρ∗G({h, g}) > ρ∗F (h). However, for all A ⊂ F , ρG(A) ≤ ρF (A).
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reveals whether or not the event E ⊂ S happens. The information cost function c
is such that c(p̄) = 0, c(π) = 1
4
, and c(π′) = ∞ for all other π′. Suppose p̄(E) = 1
2
.
Let G = {f, g, h}, where f (g) yields utility 1 when E (Ec) happens and 0 otherwise,
and h yields utility 2
3
in every state. Under prior p̄, h is optimal. But π is worth
acquiring because 1
2






. Hence, ρG(f) = ρG(g) =
1
2
and ρG(h) = 0.
Next consider F = {f, h}. It becomes optimal to acquire no information because
1
2








. Consequently, ρF (f) = 0 and ρF (h) = 1. Therefore,
ρF (f) < ρG(f), violating Monotonicity.
Observe that if the choice of information structure does not change when the menu
becomes smaller, then the choice probability of any remaining act will not decrease.
Thus we have the following behavioral implication which is weaker than Monotonicity.
Independence of Never Chosen Act (INCA):
For all F ∈ K and h ∈ F , if ρF (h) = 0, then ρF\h(A) = ρF (A) for all A ⊂ F \ h.
INCA says that given the menu F if an act h in F is never chosen, then removing it
will not affect the choice probabilities of all other acts in F . The intuition is that,
if an act is never chosen then removing it will not decrease the expected utility gain









(p · f)πF (dp).









(p · f)π(dp) ∀π 6= πF .
Therefore, the original information structure remains optimal. The agent chooses not
to change her information, and so her choice of acts remains the same.
The rationale for the violation of Monotonicity in our model is different from the
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attraction effect (Huber et al., 1982), the phenomenon whereby if g is inferior to f
then adding g into the choice set increases the chance of choosing f . Note that under
the attraction effect, g is never chosen as it is dominated by f . However, in our
model, if adding g makes f more likely to be chosen, then it must be that g is not
dominated and is chosen with positive probability.
In addition to INCA, Monotonicity has another implication. Suppose we improve
an act f by increasing its payoff in every state of nature. Will f be chosen more
often? In a random utility model, the answer is yes. This is implied by Monotonicity.
However, with rational inattention, it is possible that when an act is improved it is
chosen less frequently.

























respectively. π2 leads to posteriors q1 = (1, 0, 0)













c(π2) = 0. Let F = {f, g, h}, where u ◦ f = (20, 20, 0), u ◦ g = (0, 11, 11) and
u ◦ h = (0, 0, 20). Then f is optimal under p1 and q1, g is optimal under q2, and h is
optimal under p2. The optimal information structure is π1 because
2
3





















× q2 · (u ◦ g)︸ ︷︷ ︸
11
−c(π2).
Hence ρF (f) =
2
3
. Now suppose we replace f by f ′ such that u ◦ f ′ = (26, 20, 0). The
optimal information structure becomes π2 because
2
3





















× q2 · (u ◦ g)︸ ︷︷ ︸
11
−c(π2).
Hence we have ρ{f ′,g,h}(f
′) = 1
3
< ρF (f), even though f
′ is weakly better than f in
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every state.
In this example, while the improvement in f makes each information structure
more valuable, the increment in the value of π2 is larger, causing the change in the
choice of information. Note that p1 · [u◦ (f ′−f)] < q1 · [u◦ (f ′−f)]; i.e. the posterior
q1 values the improvement more. If u ◦ (f ′− f) were a constant instead, the utility of
the improvement would not depend on the belief. Then the choice probability would
not decrease in the above example. This observation leads to the following behavioral
property:
Constant Improvement (CI; assume the utility index is known):
For all F ∈ K and f ∈ F , if u ◦ g = (u ◦ f) + r for some constant real vector r > 0,
then ρF (f) ≤ 1− ρ(F\f)∪g(F \ f).
CI says that, if we increase the payoff (in terms of utility) of f in every state by the
same amount, then we increase the chance of choosing f . Note that the right-hand
side of the inequality is the smallest probability that the improved act is chosen. So
the increase in the choice probability is guaranteed no matter how the decision maker
breaks ties. Also note that, unlike INCA, here the choice of information structure
can change after the improvement. So CI provides a connection between choices from
two menus with potentially different private information.
We can state CI without referring to u explicitly.
Constant Improvement (CI):
Let h and h̄ be two constant acts. Suppose that ρ{h,h̄}(h̄) = 1 − ρ{h,h̄}(h) = 1. Let
f = αf ′ + (1 − α)(βh̄ + (1 − β)h) and g = αf ′ + (1 − α)(γh̄ + (1 − γ)h) where
f ′ ∈ F , α ∈ [0, 1), β, γ ∈ [0, 1] and γ > β. Then ρF (f) ≤ 1− ρ(F\f)∪g(F \ f).
Note that if ρ is rationalizable by (u, p̄, c), then u ◦ g − u ◦ f is a constant vector
(1− α)(γ − β)[u ◦ (h̄− h)]. This is a positive vector since h̄ is chosen over h. Thus,
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g is a constant improvement of f .
The decision maker in our model violates Linearity as well, which is another
implication of a random expected utility model. This says that if each act f in a menu
is replaced by αf + (1 − α)g where g and α are fixed, then the choice probabilities
remain the same.
Linearity: ρF (A) = ραF+(1−α)g(αA+ (1− α)g) ∀ f, g ∈ F , A ⊂ F ∈ K, α ∈ [0, 1].
Linearity comes from the assumption that the agent is an expected utility maximizer,
and also hinges on the menu-independence of private information. With rational
inattention, the agent may violate Linearity because she acquires different information
for F and αF+(1−α)g. In particular, the choice of information for αF+(1−α)g does
not depend on g, but it does depend on α in general. Hence we have the following
behavioral implication of our model, which is weaker than Linearity.
Independence of Degenerate Decision (IDD):
For all f, g, h ∈ F , A ⊂ F ∈ K, α ∈ [0, 1],
ραF+(1−α)g(αf + (1− α)g) = ραF+(1−α)h(αf + (1− α)h).
IDD says that the probability of choosing αf + (1 − α)g from αF + (1 − α)g does
not depend on g. The reason is that the underlying information structure remains
optimal when g is replaced by a different act.
We summarize the discussion so far in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.2. Suppose that ρ is rationalizable. Then ρ satisfies Constant Im-
provement. In addition, ρ satisfies Independence of Never Chosen Act and Indepen-
dence of Degenerate Decision generically.15
Note that we only conclude that INCA and IDD hold for almost all menus; that
15The set of all menus where INCA or IDD are violated is of the first category. The metric
we use here is dp(F,G) := dH(ch(F ), ch(G)) where dH is the Hausdorff metric. dp is therefore a
pseudometric.
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is, they might still be violated for some menus. This is because we have not imposed
any tie-breaking rule for choice of information. The intuitions behind INCA and IDD
only say that the underlying information structure remain optimal as the menu is
altered in some way. However, if there are multiple optimal information structures,
then the agent can still change her choice of information. Then she violates INCA or
IDD. Fortunately, it can be shown that the optimal information structure is unique
for almost all menus. Therefore we should observe that the stochastic choice obeys
INCA and IDD almost all the time.
In Appendix, we provide a characterization result. INCA, CI and IDD all appear
in the sufficient conditions for the rationalizability of stochastic choice.
1.5.2 Special Cases
We have seen that Linearity and Monotonicity are both violated in general. In this
section, we discuss the special cases where either Linearity or Monotonicity holds.
If the underlying information structures for F and αF + (1 − α)g are the same,
then ρF (f) = ραF+(1−α)g(αf + (1−α)g). However, if π is optimal for F and c(π) > 0,





q · (u ◦ h)π(dq)− c(π) −−→
α→0
p̄ · (u ◦ g)− c(π) < p̄ · (u ◦ g).
So it is better to acquire no information (thus incur 0 cost) when α is small. However,
if c(π) = 0, then π is optimal for αF+(1−α)g for all α ∈ [0, 1]. As a result, a sufficient
condition for Linearity is that every underlying information structure has zero cost.
It is also necessary, as shown by the following proposition.
Proposition 1.3. Suppose that ρ is rationalizable. Then ρ satisfies Linearity gener-
ically if and only if it is rationalized by (u, p̄, c) where c(π) ∈ {0,∞} for all π ∈ Π(p̄).
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What will happen if we impose Monotonicity instead of Linearity in our model?
We argue that this eliminates rational inattention. The key is that when ρ is ratio-
nalizable, Monotonicity implies Linearity (Lemma A.6). When they both hold, the
model reduces to one with a fixed information structure underlying all menus; that
is, a random subjective expected utility model with fixed taste (Lu, 2016). Therefore,
Monotonicity is the main behavioral difference between a rational inattention model
and an exogenous and fixed information model.
Proposition 1.4. Suppose that ρ is rationalizable. Then ρ satisfies Monotonicity
if and only if it is rationalized by (u, p̄, c) where there exists π∗ ∈ Π(p̄) such that
c(π∗) = 0 and c(π) =∞ otherwise.
1.6 Discussion: “Data”
1.6.1 Comparison of different types of choice data
In the literature, there have been two different types of data used to recover un-
observed information costs: menu-choice data (de Oliveira et al., 2017) and state-
dependent choice data (Caplin and Dean, 2015; Ellis, 2018). The former is summa-
rized by a preference relation % over menus. It is assumed that the choice between
menus is made before information acquisition, and so it is deterministic. Accordingly,
in the model % is represented by the value function of information acquisition prob-
lem. In our paper, the observable choice is assumed to be made after information
acquisition, and so it is random. The preference over menus is not observed directly,
but is inferred from random choice of act.
State-dependent choice data generally take the form of ρ∗F (A, s), which is under-
stood as the probability that, conditional on s being the true state, the set of all
optimal acts in F is A. To collect such data, an analyst needs to observe not only the
choice of act but also the realized state of nature. Note that if the frequency of each
state is also observed, say γ(s), then (unconditional) random choice can be recovered
27
by ρF (A) =
∑
s γ(s)ρF (A, s).
In some situations, unconditional choice data may be more readily available than
state-dependent choice data because observing the realized state may be more difficult
than observing just the choice of act. For example, a department wants to hire
professors. Each applicant corresponds to a menu: hire or reject (two acts). The
payoff of an act depends on this applicant’s research ability (state of nature). The
department can acquire information by reading her papers, holding interviews, or
contacting her referees. In this context, the true state is not revealed immediately
and not easily detected. An analyst may need to follow this applicant’s future career
performance for a sufficiently long period of time in order to determine the true state.
Our contribution is to show how to identify the parameters of the rational inattention
model when the realized state of nature is not readily observable.
1.6.2 Multi-valued or single-valued choice
We allow multi-valued random choice and assume agnosticism about tie-breaking.
This leads to imprecise probabilistic predictions for choice of act. Instead, one might
consider only a single-valued random choice, that is, a random choice function (RCF),
which is an RCC ρ∗ such that ρ∗F (A) > 0 only if A is a singleton. In order to rationalize
an RCF, one may adopt a tie-breaking rule. However, it is unclear the form this should
take. For example, does the rule depend on the menu or unspecified factors outside
the model? If a modeler is unwilling to assume a tie-breaking rule, then one might
assume that the optimal act is always unique. But this is an unnatural restriction
on the information cost function. The essence of rational inattention modeling is to
capture the limited ability to process information. It is unnatural to assume that an
agent is able to learn information which is rich enough to yield a unique optimal act
in all menus.
Observing multi-valued choice (indifference) is always a challenge in choice theory.
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However, we believe that a random choice correspondence is in principle observable.
For example, suppose that we face a heterogeneous population and from each indi-
vidual, we observe multi-valued deterministic choice out of a menu (each individual
might face the menu more than one time). Then we can form an RCC. Here the
hypothesis is that preference is fixed for each individual but varies across the popu-
lation. For another example, suppose that we observe choice from a menu repeatedly
within a day and also across many days. If we hypothesize that preference is fixed
within a day but varies across days, then we can form an RCC by treating choice
within a day as deterministic and multi-valued. Overall, even if the raw data does
not come as an RCC directly, an analyst can form an RCC based on her conjecture.
In fact, our identification strategy is valid even if an analyst ignores indifference
in choice and collects choice frequencies naively. To see this, note that to perform
our identification strategy, an analyst needs to compute the value of menu F by
the formula V (F ) =
∫ 1
0
ρF∪fa(F )da. The integrand is understood as the probability
(maximal probability) that some act in F is optimal (chosen) out of F ∪ fa. By
Constant Improvement, ρF∪fa(F ) is weakly increasing in a because f
b is a constant
improvement of fa for b < a. In fact, CI implies that, for all b < a,
ρF∪fb(F ) ≤ 1− ρF∪fa(fa) ≤ ρF∪fa(F ).
Therefore, ρF∪fa(F ) is continuous at almost all a. Moreover, at every continuity point,
1−ρF∪fa(fa) = ρF∪fa(F ) because if a is a continuity point and the second inequality
were strict, then the first inequality would be violated when b is close enough to a.
Thus, for almost all a, the probability that some act in F is chosen from F ∪fa equals
the probability that some act in F is optimal in F ∪ fa. Consequently, an analyst
can correctly compute V (F ) even if he is not aware of whether the observed choice






A classic model of random choice is random utility theory. It can be interpreted
as follows. In a heterogeneous population, suppose each individual maximizes her
preference. Given any feasible set D of alternatives, as different individual might make
different choice, the choice behavior of this population is summarized by a distribution
over D, which is determined by the distribution of preferences in the population.1 In
the context of choice under risk, a special case of the model is random expected
utility (REU). All individuals in the population are expected utility maximizers, but
their risk attitudes are not identical. Under REU, the distribution of preferences
is uniquely recoverable from random choice (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2006). In other
words, when an analyst observes only the choice frequencies for this population then,
under the assumption that each individual’s preference conforms to expected utility
theory, she is able to identify a unique distribution of preferences consistent with the
observed behavior.
The focus on expected utility preferences is natural as a first step, but is not
completely satisfactory in light of its well-known descriptive failures, such as the
1Random utility theory can also model the stochastic behavior of a single agent. It hypothesizes
that the agent’s preference is random according to a fixed distribution. Facing a feasible set of
alternatives, she first perceives the realized preference and then makes a rational choice. Hence,
from ex-ante point of view, her choice appears random.
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Allais paradox. One might suspect that the observed random choice of lotteries could
be rationalized by random non-expected utility but not by REU.
This paper studies the identification of random non-expected utility. Suppose that
risk preferences are random but do not conform to expected utility theory. We show
by example that random choice may not identify a unique distribution of preferences.2
In fact, non-uniqueness obtains even if risk preferences are confined to the betweenness
(implicit expected utility) class, developed by Dekel (1986) and Chew (1983, 1989),
and they are all monotonic with respect to first-order stochastic dominance.
Although random choice cannot be rationalized by two distinct REUs, it may be
rationalized by both REU and random non-expected utility. In particular, we give an
example illustrating that even if the observed choice distribution from a population
can be rationalized by random expected utility, it is still possible that no individual in
the population is an expected-utility maximizer.
We suggest a reason for such non-uniqueness. Under the classic notion of random
choice, the distribution of choice from each feasible set is observable. However, the
joint distribution of choice across any two feasible sets is not. Under REU, random
choice implicitly reveals all joint choice distributions and so pins down a unique
distribution of preferences. Once we deviate from expected utility, random choice no
longer reveals such information. Thus, non-uniqueness obtains.
Depending on the domain of risk preferences, uniqueness may be restored if joint
distributions of choice across a limited number of feasible sets are observable. For
instance, we show that when there are three prizes and all risk preferences follow
weighted utility theory (Chew, 1983), joint distributions of choice across three binary
sets identify a unique distribution of preferences.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces random implicit
2This is also the case when the set of all alternatives is arbitrary and finite. See Barberá and
Pattanaik (1986) for an example of random choice that can be rationalized by more than one random
utility.
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expected utility (RIEU). Section 3 provides two examples of two distinct RIEUs
that induce the same random choice. Hence the distribution of risk preferences is
not uniquely identified. Section 4 discusses the reason for such non-uniqueness and
demonstrates that uniqueness may be restored if choice data are suitably enriched.
In the appendix, we point out three behavioral properties of RIEU.
2.2 Random Implicit Expected Utility
There is a finite set of prizes denoted W = {w1, w2, · · · , wN+1} for N ≥ 1. The
objects of choice are lotteries over W . Let ∆ := {p ∈ RN+ :
∑N
n=1 p
n ≤ 1} be the set of
all lotteries. For each p ∈ ∆, its nth coordinate pn is the probability of winning the
prize wn, for all n = 1, · · · , N , and pN+1 := 1−
∑N
n=1 p
n is the probability of winning
the prize wN+1. A lottery assigning probability one to the prize w ∈ W is denoted
by w.
A menu is a finite set of lotteries. Let D denote the set of all menus.
Choice from a menu is modeled as a random closed set. In particular, for any
A,D ∈ D, we denote by ρD(A) the probability that A is the set of all optimal lotteries
in D. To ensure feasibility, we require that if ρD(A) > 0 then A is a nonempty subset
of D. Let Π be the set of all probability measures over the class of all closed sets in
Rn. The choice behavior is summarized by a random choice correspondence, defined
as follows.
Definition 2.1. A random choice correspondence (RCC) is a function ρ : D → Π
with ρD({A ∈ D : ∅ 6= A ⊂ D}) = 1 for all D ∈ D.
We consider a random utility model where each possible preference over ∆ belongs
to the betweenness class. Following Dekel (1986), define betweenness preference as
follows.
Definition 2.2. A binary relation % over ∆ is called a betweenness preference if it
satisfies:
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1. % is complete and transitive.
2. There exist best and worst elements in ∆ which are the sure prizes in W ,
denoted by w̄ and w respectively.
3. If p  q  r, then there exists α ∈ (0, 1) such that αp+ (1− α)q ∼ r.
4. (Betweenness)
If p  q, then p  αp+ (1− α)q  q for all α ∈ (0, 1).
If p ∼ q, then p ∼ αp+ (1− α)q ∼ q for all α ∈ (0, 1).
A notable feature of such preference is that for any p ∈ ∆, the indifference set
{q ∈ ∆ : q ∼ p} is the intersection of a hyperplane and ∆. Moreover, this hyperplane
divides ∆ into the upper and the lower contour sets of p (i.e. {q ∈ ∆ : q  p} and
{q ∈ ∆ : q ≺ p}). However, two indifference sets need not be parallel (i.e. their
corresponding hyperplanes can intersect in Rn). If we strengthen Betweenness to
Independence:
∀α ∈ (0, 1], ∀p, q, r,∈ ∆, p % q ⇔ αp+ (1− α)r % αq + (1− α)r,
then % becomes an expected-utility preference whose indifference sets are all parallel
to each other. See Figure 2·1 as examples of betweenness preference and expected-
utility preference in the Marschak-Machina triangle.
Each betweenness preference has an implicit expected utility representation which
we state in Appendix A.
Let M(A,%) be the set of all optimal lotteries in A according to %; that is,
M(A,%) = {p ∈ A : p % q ∀ q ∈ A}.
Let Ω denote the set of all betweenness preferences over ∆. Let N(D,A) denote the










A stylized betweenness preference is depicted in (a). The indifference set containing p,
denoted I(p), is the intersection of a straight line and the simplex. Two indifference sets
can be non-parallel. A stylized expected-utility preference is depicted in (b), where all
indifference sets are parallel. (Arrows indicate the direction of increasing preference.)
D; that is,
N(D,A) := {%∈ Ω : A = M(D,%)}.
Let
C := {N(D,A) : A,D ∈ D}. (2.1)
Let F(C) denote the smallest field that contains every element of C.
A random implicit expected utility (RIEU) is a finitely additive probability mea-
sure µ on (Ω,F(C)). Say that ρ is rationalized by RIEU µ if ρD(A) equals the
probability that A is the set of all optimal lotteries in D.
Definition 2.3. Random choice correspondence ρ is rationalized by random implicit
expected utility µ if, for all D,A ∈ D,
ρD(A) = µ(N(D,A)).
Remark 2.1. One can define different random utility model by considering different
domain of preferences. For instance, one can obtain a special case of RIEU by re-
stricting Ω to be the set of all weighted utility preferences, all disappointment aversion
preferences, or all expected utility preferences.3
3In general, one can define a random utility model in a similar fashion for any domain of choice
alternatives and domain of preferences. If the choice domain is a finite set, then Ω may be the set
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2.3 Non-Uniqueness of RIEU
In general, an RCC may be rationalized by more than one RIEU. We provide two
examples to illustrate this point. In particular, the first example shows that non-
uniqueness obtains even if risk preferences are all monotonic with respect to first-order
stochastic dominance. The second example illustrates random choice consistent with
random expected utility that can also be rationalized by more than one random
weighted utility, a special case of RIEU.
2.3.1 Example 1
We define two RIEUs µ and µ′ as follows. Under µ, the realized preference is either
%1 or %2 with equal probability. Figure 2·2 depicts their indifference maps. Under µ′,
the realized preference is either %′1 or %
′
2 with equal probability. Figure 2·3 depicts
their indifference maps.
Note that these four preferences have identical indifference set of w3. Above that
set, %1 and %′1 have the same indifference map, and so do %2 and %
′
2. Below that
set, %1 and %′2 have the same indifference map, and so do %2 and %
′
1.
Below we provide numerical representations of %i and %′i, for i ∈ {1, 2}. In
particular, %1 and %2 both follow weighted utility theory (Chew, 1983), which is a









where u(·) and g(·) are real-valued functions defined on W , and g is non-zero and
nonnegative (or nonpositive).
Suppose that N = 2. Let u(·) be such that u(w1) = 0, u(w2) = 1, and u(w3) = 12 .
of all linear orders. If the choice domain is the set of all Anscombe-Aumann acts, then Ω may be




















(a): The preference %1 is represented by the weighted utility function V1. The worst lot-




(b): The preference %2 is represented by the weighted utility function V2. The worst



















(a): The preference %′1 is represented by the utility function V
′
1 . The worst lottery is w1
and the best lottery is w2. For lotteries which are better than w3, their indifference curves
intersect at x1 = (− 12 ,−
1
2
). For lotteries which are worse than w3, their indifference
curves intersect at x2 = (1, 1).
(b): The preference %′2 is represented by the utility function V
′
2 . The worst lottery is
w1 and the best lottery is w2. For lotteries which are better than w3, their indifference
curves intersect at x2 = (1, 1). For lotteries which are worse than w3, their indifference





Let g1(·) be such that g1(w1) = g1(w2) = 1 and g1(w3) = 12 , and let g2(·) be such
that g2(w1) = g2(w2) = 1 and g2(w3) = 2. Let Vi(·) be the weighted utility function
defined by u and gi for i ∈ {1, 2}; that is,
V1(p) =









p2 + [(1− p1 − p2)× 2× 1
2
]
p1 + p2 + [(1− p1 − p2)× 2]
.
Define utility function V ′i (·) for i ∈ {1, 2} such that
V ′1(p) =
{





V2(p) if V2(p) ≥ 12 ,
V1(p) otherwise.
For i ∈ {1, 2}, Vi represents %i, and V ′i represents %′i. Obviously, these four
preferences all are betweenness preferences.4 They also agree on the ranking of prizes:
w1 is the worst prize, and w2 is the best prize. Moreover, if we define first-order
stochastic dominance based on this ranking of prizes, then under all these preferences,
p is better than q whenever p dominates q.5
RCC ρ is rationalized by µ if and only if it is rationalized by µ′. To see this,
suppose that lottery p is such that V1(p) ≥ 12 . Then V2(p) ≥
1
2
. For any other
lottery q, p %1 q ⇔ p %′1 q and p %2 q ⇔ p %′2 q. Similarly, if V1(p) < 12 , then
p %1 q ⇔ p %′2 q and p %2 q ⇔ p %′1 q. Since µ(%i) = µ′(%′j) for all i, j ∈ {1, 2}, the
probability that p is better than q is the same under µ and µ′. It is straightforward
to extend the argument to show that, for any menu D and A ⊂ D, the probability
that A is the set of all optimal lotteries in D is the same under µ and µ′.
4In fact, %′1 and %
′
2 both follow semi-weighted utility (Chew, 1989). A key geometric feature
of such preference is that, there are at most two points outside the Marschak-Machina triangle at
which two indifference curves can intersect. Our example illustrates that non-uniqueness obtains
even if we further confine risk preferences to the class of semi-weighted utility.
5In Figures 2·2 and 2·3, preferences increase when we shift a lottery toward northwest. Therefore,
they are monotonic with respect to first-order stochastic dominance.
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Therefore, RCC induced by µ can be rationalized by at least two RIEUs. We
conclude that, under RIEU, random choice may not identify a unique distribution of
preferences.
Proposition 2.1. There exists a random choice correspondence rationalizable by
more than one random implicit expected utility.
2.3.2 Example 2
We will review in Section 4 that a random choice correspondence cannot be rational-
ized by two different random expected utilities (REU). However, it might be ratio-
nalizable by REU and also by random non-expected utility. The following example
illustrates. In particular, it shows that random expected utility and random weighted
utility can induce identical random choice.
When there are only three prizes, each weighted utility preference (Chew, 1983)
is characterized by (i) a point outside the Marschak-Machina triangle at which all
indifference curves intersect, and (ii) the direction of increasing preference (either
clockwise or counterclockwise).6
Construct RWU ν1 as follows (see Figure 2·4). Fix a circle surrounding the trian-
gle. Let all possible intersection points of indifference curves be distributed uniformly
on the circle. Moreover, conditional on any intersection point, let the direction of
increasing preference be clockwise or counterclockwise with equal probability.
Figure 2·5 illustrates the implication of ν1 for random choice. Suppose that ρ
is rationalized by ν1. Take any p, q, r ∈ ∆. Taking p as the vertex, let α be the









Let ν2 be a uniform distribution over expected utility preferences. Then, under





. In fact, for any
6Here, we exclude expected utility from the class of weighted utility instead of viewing it as a
special case. That is, we mean “strict” weighted utility.
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p ∈ ∆, ν1 and ν2 induce the identical distribution over the class of lower contour sets
{p′ ∈ ∆ : p % p′}. Therefore, ν1 and ν2 induce the same random choice.
Note that when constructing ν1, the circle surrounding the triangle is chosen
arbitrarily. By choosing a different circle, we can construct another RWU that also
rationalizes ρ. Thus, non-uniqueness obtains even if all preferences are confined to
the (strict) weighted utility class.
Proposition 2.2. There exists a random choice correspondence rationalizable by
more than one random weighted utility. There exists a random choice correspondence
rationalizable by both random expected utility and random weighted utility.
Suppose that an analyst aims to test expected utility theory at the individual
level, but only has choice data at the group level. Then she might consider testing
REU theory instead. However, while the consistency between observed random choice
and REU is necessary for all individuals to be expected-utility maximizers, it is not
sufficient. Our example illustrates that, even if the observed behavior satisfies all the
axioms of REU, it could be that no individual in the population is an expected-utility
maximizer.
This observation connects to classical demand theory. It is known that, even if
each consumer behaves irrationally, aggregate demand could satisfy the weak axiom
of revealed preference, even be consistent with maximization of a single preference
(Becker, 1962; Grandmont, 1992).
Remark 2.2. In the above example, unlike the one in Section 3.1, all possible prefer-
ences do not agree on the ranking of prizes. If we consider lotteries over monetary
prizes, then it is natural to assume that risk preferences are increasing in prizes, even
monotonic in first-order stochastic dominance. Whether or not Proposition 2.2 holds










(a): The preference follows weighted utility theory. All indifference curves intersect at
x1, and the preference increases counterclockwise.
(b): The preference follows weighted utility theory. All indifference curves intersect at











Under ν1, the realized preference ranks p optimal in D ≡ {p, q, r} if and only if either (i)
the indifference curves intersect at some point on arc ÂBC and the preference increases
clockwise, or (ii) the indifference curves intersect at some point on arc D̂EF and the
preference increases counterclockwise. Because all possible intersection points distribute
uniformly on the circle, the realized point lies on ÂBC ∪ D̂EF with probability 1− α
180
.








if ρ is rationalized by ν1.
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2.4 Discussion
2.4.1 Uniqueness of random expected utility
In contrast to Proposition 2.1, when all possible preferences conform to expected
utility theory then random choice identifies a unique distribution of preferences.
Theorem 2.1 (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2006). A random choice correspondence is ra-
tionalized by at most one random expected utility.
We suggest the reason for this difference between REU and RIEU. The key con-
cerns the joint distribution of choice across two or more menus. Such information is
implicitly revealed through random choice under REU, but not under RIEU. To see
this, we first review how unique identification obtains under REU.7
Sketch of Proof. We need some preliminaries. First, define REU formally. Let ΩE
denote the set of all expected utility preferences over ∆. Let
NE(D,A) := {%∈ ΩE : A = M(D,%)}.
Then let
CE := {NE(D,A) : A,D ∈ D},
and let F(CE) denote the smallest field that contains every element of CE. A random
expected utility (REU) is a finitely additive probability measure µE on (ΩE,F(CE)).
A class A of subsets of a set X is called a semiring if (i) ∅ ∈ A; (ii) if A,B ∈ A
then A ∩ B ∈ A; (iii) if A,B ∈ A then A \ B = ∪mk=1Ck for some mutually disjoint
sets C1, · · · , Cm ∈ A. Say that A is a semifield if it is a semiring and X ∈ A. A set
function is a mapping ν : A → R. The set function ν is finitely additive if ν(∪mi=1Ai) =∑m
i=1 ν(Ai) for any finite collection of mutually disjoint sets {A1, · · · , Am} ⊂ A such
that ∪mi=1Ai ∈ A.
The argument for the unique identification of REU is the following. Given RCC
ρ, define a set function µ∗E : CE → [0, 1] such that µ∗E(NE(D,A)) = ρD(A) for
all NE(D,A) ∈ CE. Suppose that ρ is rationalized by REU. Then µ∗E is a finitely
7See Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) or Lin (2018) for the details. The former considers only single-
valued random choice; that is, ρD(A) > 0 only if A is a singleton. The latter shows that the same
result holds for a general random choice correspondence.
41
additive set function. Since CE is a semifield, the extension theorem (Rao and Rao,
1983, Theorem 3.5.1) applies, and the set function µ∗E can be extended to a finitely
additive measure µE on F(CE). Moreover, such extension is unique. Hence µE is the
unique REU that rationalizes ρ.
The key to the uniqueness of REU is that CE is a semifield. This ensures that
the extension of µ∗E is unique. To identify RIEU, define C by (2.1) and then define
a set function µ∗ : C → [0, 1] such that, for all N(D,A) ∈ C, µ∗(N(D,A)) = ρD(A).
RIEU µ rationalizes ρ if and only if it is an extension of µ∗. However, C is not a
semifield. Hence the extension of µ∗ may not be unique. If, on (Ω,F(C)), there exist
two different probability measures µ and µ′ that both agree with µ∗ on C, then both
of them are RIEUs and rationalize ρ.
The class C fails to be a semifield because it is not closed under finite intersections.
That is, even if N(D,A) and N(D′, A′) are both in C, N(D,A) ∩ N(D′, A′) may be
not. This reflects the fact that, under RIEU, random choice does not reveal the joint
distribution of choice across two menus. That is, ρ does not give the joint probability
that A is the set of all optimal lotteries in D and A′ is the set of all optimal lotteries
in D′.







), p′ = (1
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). They are depicted in Figures 2·2 and 2·3. Note
that p 1 (′1)q and p′ ≺1 (′1)q′, and that p ≺2 (≺′2)q and p′ 2 (≺′2)q′. Therefore,
under µ, the probability that p is chosen over q and p′ is chosen over q′ is 0. However,
under µ′, this probability equals 1
2
. Thus, µ and µ′ disagree on the joint distribution
of choice across {p, q} and {p′, q′}.8
8Similarly, in our second example, v1 and v2 could be distinguished if we were given joint dis-





2r for some r. Under ν1, the probability of p being chosen from {p, q} and q
′ being chosen
from {p′, q′} is positive. Under ν2, that probability is zero. In other words, if ν1 is the actual distri-
bution of preferences, then with positive probability, the joint choice will violate the independence
axiom .
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On the other hand, the class CE is closed under finite intersections because, for
any λ ∈ (0, 1),9
NE(D,A) ∩NE(D′, A′) = NE(λD + (1− λ)D′, λA+ (1− λ)A′) ∈ CE.
This follows from the independence axiom of expected utility. Specifically, for any
expected utility preference %E, {p, q} ⊂ D, {p′, q′} ⊂ D′, and λ ∈ (0, 1),
p %E q ⇔ λp+ (1− λ)p′ %E λq + (1− λ)p′;
p′ %E q
′ ⇔ λp+ (1− λ)p′ %E λp+ (1− λ)q′.
These imply that λp + (1 − λ)p′ is optimal in λD + (1 − λ)D′ if and only if p and
p′ are optimal in D and D′ respectively. In words, under REU, the distribution of
choice from the mixture of D and D′ reveals the joint distribution of choice across
D and D′. Once we deviate from REU, we may lose such information from random
choice.
2.4.2 Joint choice distributions and random weighted utility
A natural follow-up is to study what is the minimal requirement on choice data for
unique identification. Or at least, study how to enrich data to narrow down the set of
rationalizing random preferences. The above discussion suggests that collecting data
on joint distributions of choice across different menus may be helpful.
Regardless of the domain of preferences, if the joint distribution of choice across
any number of menus is observable, then the distribution of preferences is uniquely
recoverable. It is because the class
{∩ki=1N(Di, Ai) : Ai, Di ∈ D ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ k; k ≥ 1}
9Define mixtures of menus D and D′ by λD + (1− λ)D′ := {λp+ (1− λ)p′ : p ∈ D, p′ ∈ D′} for
any λ ∈ (0, 1].
43
is closed under finite intersection. Such class is called a π-system. If two probability
measures agree on a π-system that generates the field where they are defined, then
they are the same measure.10
However, it seems far-fetched to assume that all joint distributions of choice are
observable. An advantage of REU is that no joint choice distribution is needed to
identify the distribution of preferences. If we deviate from REU but still consider a
restrictive domain of preferences, then joint distributions of choice across a limited
number of menus might be sufficient. We demonstrate this point in a setting where
there are only three prizes and all preferences are confined to the weighted utility
class.
What are the minimal observations to completely determine a weighted utility
preference on the Marschak-Machina triangle? If we know p ∼ q, p′ ∼ q′, and
p′′  q′′, then we can infer the relation between any two lotteries. This is because the
lines ←→pq and
←→
p′q′ determine the intersection point of all the indifference curves, and
then p′′  q′′ determines the direction of the increasing preference. A similar result
holds for random weighted utility: Joint distributions of choice across three binary
menus pin down a unique distribution of preferences.
Proposition 2.3. Suppose that there are three prizes. Suppose that the joint distri-
bution of choice across any three binary menus is observable. Then such behavior is
rationalizable by at most one random weighted utility.
Proof. Now Ω denotes the set of all weighted utility preferences. The class C is still
defined by (2.1), and F(C) is the smallest field generated by C.
As shown in Appendix C, if two random weighted utilities µ and µ′ agree on the
class
{∩3i=1N({pi, qi}, Ai) : Ai ⊂ {pi, qi} ⊂ ∆ ∀ i = 1, · · · , 3},
then they also agree on the class
E := {∩ki=1N({pi, qi}, Ai) : Ai ⊂ {pi, qi} ⊂ ∆ ∀ i = 1, · · · , k; k ≥ 1}.
10This follows from Dynkin’s π-λ theorem.
44
The class E is a π-system. Moreover, the smallest field generated by E is also F(C).
Therefore, µ and µ′ agree on F(C).
The key is that the joint distribution of choice across any four or more binary
menus can be deduced from the observeble. Figure 2·6 illustrates. There are four
pairs of lotteries, {(pi, qi)}4i=1. If pi  qi, then% rotates at some point (the intersection
of all its indifference curves) in one side of the line ←→piqi clockwise (the direction of
increasing preference), or in another side counterclockwise. Thus, in Figure 2·6(a), if
pi  qi for all i, then % rotates at some point in the blue area clockwise, or in the
green area counterclockwise.
In Figure 2·6(b), we plot three additional lotteries r, s, and t. The lines ←→rs and
←→
rt divide the blue and green areas into five regions. Note that, for instance, if r  s,
t  r, and p4  q4, then % rotates at some point in the region R2 clockwise, or in R5
counterclockwise. One can verify that
pi  qi ∀ i = 1, · · · , 4⇐⇒ (p1  q1 ∧ p2  q2 ∧ s  r)
∨ (r % s ∧ t % r ∧ p4  q4) (2.2)
∨ (p1  q1 ∧ r  t ∧ p3  q3) .
The right-hand side is a disjunction of three mutually exclusive statements. Let
PD1,D2,D3 denote the joint distribution of choice across menus D1, D2, and D3. Then
(2) implies that
Probability that pi is chosen from {pi, qi} for all i = 1, · · · , 4
=P{p1,q1},{p2,q2},{r,s} (p1, p2, s) + P{r,s},{r,t},{p4,q4} (r ∨ {r, s}, t ∨ {r, t}, p4)
+ P{p1,q1},{r,t},{p3,q3} (p1, r, p3) .
























(a): Suppose that % is a weighted utility preference. Then pi  qi for all i = 1, · · · , 4 if
and only if % rotates at some point in the blue area clockwise or rotates at some point
in the green area counterclockwise.
(b): Suppose that % is a weighted utility preference. Then p1  q1, p2  q2, and s  r
if and only if % rotates at some point in the area R1; r  s, t  r, and p4  q4 if and
only if % rotates at some point in the area R2 or R5; p1  q1, r  t, and p3  q3 if and
only if % rotates at some point in the area R3 or R4.
is not observed directly, it is implicitly revealed through the observables. Once we
have joint distributions of choice across three binary menus, we automatically get all
joint choice distributions. Hence we can identify a unique distribution of preferences.
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Chapter 3
Revealed “Betweenness” Preference over
Lotteries
3.1 Introduction
Revealed preference analysis addresses the challenge of how to test theories of choice
given that data contain only finitely many observations. Classical analyses are first
conducted in an abstract choice framework where data contain choices out of finite
feasible sets, and secondly in a consumer theory framework with choices out of budget
sets. In both cases, the tested theory is maximization of a single preference relation
satisfying minimal assumptions such as completeness and transitivity.
More recent work deals with choice under risk, where data consist of choices out of
feasible sets of lotteries. Consistency with expected utility (EU) maximization is one
hypothesis to be tested. The focus on EU preferences is natural as a first step, but is
not completely satisfactory in light of its well-known descriptive failures, such as the
Allais paradox. These have stimulated development of several “non-expected” (non-
EU) models of risk preferences. Many of those models have axiomatic foundations;
however, when facing finite data, axioms are necessary but not sufficient for validity
of a model. This paper’s objective is to derive a complete characterization for the
consistency of a finite dataset with a non-EU preference.
The particular non-EU theory considered is the “betweenness preference” (Dekel,
1986), special cases of which include Chew (1983) and Gul (1991). It generalizes EU
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in a way that is most easily described when there are only three prizes. Then each
lottery can be identified as a point in the probability simplex, and a risk preference
can be described through its indifference map in the simplex. For EU, all indifference
curves are linear and parallel, while for betweenness preference, they are linear but
not necessarily parallel. Dropping parallelism permits accommodation of Allais-type
behavior studied in laboratory settings. Retaining linearity preserves many important
economic results from EU theory, such as the existence of Nash equilibrium and no
Dutch book in dynamic choice.
This paper provides conditions on choice data that are both necessary and suffi-
cient for the data be consistent with maximization of a betweenness preference. They
also indicate how to construct a consistent preference. Moreover, because they de-
scribe the exhaustive testable implications of betweenness preference maximization,
they provide a more stringent test than what is used in the experimental literature,
which is to check for direct violations of the key axiom (also called betweenness).
The analysis for EU theory exploits both linearity and parallelism, which together
imply that the entire indifference map is uniquely determined by a single indifference
curve. Therefore, the consistency of data with some EU preference is equivalent to the
existence of a single (suitably supporting) hyperplane. Without parallelism, however,
the analysis for betweenness preference translates into examining the existence of
many supporting hyperplanes, one for each observation in data. In particular, those
hyperplanes cannot intersect within the simplex, and they have to be suitably ordered
so that they can be extended to a complete indifference map for some betweenness
preference. These issues do not arise for EU. Consequently, the analysis is a nontrivial
extension of that for EU and employs novel geometric arguments.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the general model.
Section 3 provides several figures to illustrate the difference between the analysis for
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betweenness preference and the one for EU, and to illustrate key geometric features
of datasets consistent or inconsistent with betweenness preference. Section 4 gives a
characterization. The proof of the main result is contained in the appendix.
3.2 The Model
There is a finite set of prizes denoted W = {w1, w2, · · · , wN+1} for N ≥ 1. The
objects of choice are lotteries over W . Let ∆ := {p ∈ RN+ :
∑N
n=1 p
n ≤ 1} be the set of
all lotteries. For each p ∈ ∆, its nth coordinate pn is the probability of winning the
prize wn, for all n = 1, · · · , N , and pN+1 := 1−
∑N
n=1 p
n is the probability of winning
the prize wN+1. A lottery assigning probability one to the prize w ∈ W is denoted
by w.
A menu is a finite set of lotteries. A dataset D is a finite set of observations. Each
observation is a pair (D,A), where A is a menu and ∅ 6= D ⊂ A. The interpretation
is that D is observed to be chosen from A (so choice may be multi-valued).
Following Dekel (1986), define betweenness preference as follows.
Definition 3.1. A binary relation % over ∆ is called a betweenness preference if it
satisfies:
1. % is complete and transitive.
2. There exist best and worst elements in ∆ which are the sure prizes in W ,
denoted by w̄ and w respectively.
3. If p  q  r, then there exists α ∈ (0, 1) such that αp+ (1− α)q ∼ r.
4. (Betweenness)
If p  q, then p  αp+ (1− α)q  q for all α ∈ (0, 1).
If p ∼ q, then p ∼ αp+ (1− α)q ∼ q for all α ∈ (0, 1).
A notable feature of such preference is that for any p ∈ ∆, the indifference set










A stylized betweenness preference is depicted in (a). The indifference set containing p,
denoted I(p), is the intersection of a straight line and the simplex. Two indifference sets
can be non-parallel. A stylized expected-utility preference is depicted in (b). All indif-
ference sets are parallel. In both figures, preference increases in the northwest direction
as indicated.
divides ∆ into the upper and the lower contour sets of p (i.e. {q ∈ ∆ : q  p} and
{q ∈ ∆ : q ≺ p}). However, two indifference sets need not be parallel (i.e. their
corresponding hyperplanes can intersect in RN). If we strengthen Betweenness to
Independence:
∀α ∈ (0, 1], ∀p, q, r,∈ ∆, p % q ⇔ αp+ (1− α)r % αq + (1− α)r,
then % becomes an expected-utility preference whose indifference sets are all parallel
to each other. See Figure 3·1 for examples of betweenness preference and expected-
utility preference in a Marschak-Machina triangle.
Let M(A,%) be the set of all optimal lotteries in A according to %; that is,
M(A,%) = {p ∈ A : p % q ∀ q ∈ A}.
Definition 3.2. A dataset D is rationalizable if there exists a betweenness preference
% such that
D = M(A,%) ∀ (D,A) ∈ D.
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3.3 Geometric Illustrations
We use several figures to illustrate challenges for construction of a rationalizing pref-
erence and geometric features of (non-)rationalizable datasets. In this section, there
are only three prizes, and hence each lottery will be identified as a point in the prob-
ability simplex in R2. In all figures, we use dashed lines to indicate the boundary
of the convex hull of a menu. We use filled (unfilled) circles to indicate the chosen
(unchosen) lotteries of a menu.
The terminology and geometric concepts used in our analyses are given in the
appendix. In particular, for p ∈ ∆ and A ⊂ ∆, C(p,A) denotes the intersection of ∆
and the smallest convex cone with apex at p that contains p and A.
We first review the analysis for EU preference. Parallelism of indifference curves
allows us to translate the entire dataset into a single observation. Then the consis-
tency with EU theory is equivalent to the existence of a single supporting hyperplane.
Figure 3·2 illustrates. Suppose that we observe pk be chosen from Ak for k = 1, 2 in
Figure 3·2(a). We can parallel shift p2 and A2 as a whole to get p′2 and A′2 such that
p′2 = p1, as shown in Figure 3·2(b). Parallelism of indifference curves imply that p2
is optimal in A2 if and only if p1 is optimal in A
′
2. Therefore, the original dataset is
consistent with EU if and only if the single observation (p1, A1∪A′2) is too. But then
such consistency requires the existence of a hyperplane that supports A1 ∪ A′2 at p1.
Every such hyperplane defines a EU preference consistent with the dataset.
Under betweenness preference, we cannot shift observations because indifference
curves are not parallel in general. In fact, dropping parallelism is a key to rationalize
those experimental evidence of violation of EU theory. Nevertheless, to construct a
rationalizing preference, we still have to find a set of supporting hyperplanes, one for
each observation in data. Then we extend them to a complete indifference map of a



























Not every such set of hyperplanes can be extended. One requirement is that every
two of them does not intersect within the simplex. Consider dataset D = {(pk, Ak}2k=1
as in Figure 3·3. We are able to find a hyperplane supporting A1 at p1, and similarly
for (p2, A2). But not every pair of such hyperplanes can be extended to a betweenness
preference because they might intersect within the simplex as in Figure 3·3(a). The
hyperplanes in Figure 3·3(b), however, can be extended to a betweenness preference
that rationalizes the data.
Even if those supporting hyperplanes are disjoint within the simplex, they cannot
be extended to a consistent preference unless they are “well ordered”. In Figure 3·4(a),
those supporting hyperplanes cannot be extended to a betweenness preference. To

















separate H1∩∆ and H3∩∆, which is not the case. There is no way to rank those hy-
perplanes from low to high. In Figure 3·4(b), those hyperplanes can be extended, but
not to a consistent preference because at least one of the observation will come from
minimization of preference. (Note that in both figures datasets are rationalizable.
We just need to find right sets of supporting hyperplanes.)
To facilitate the construction of a consistent preference, we can suitably transform
a dataset. Linearity of indifference curves implies that we can always work with convex
cones. In Figure 3·5, (p,A) is rationalizable because the hyperplane H1 supports A
at p. Equivalently, H1 supports C(p,A) (convex hull of {p, s, t}) at p. Obviously,
any single observation (p,A) is rationalizable if and only if p is an extreme point of
C(p,A). This is the single-observation special case of our main result, and is applied
frequently below.
Figure 3·6(a) illustrates a dataset that is not rationalizable. If this dataset were
rationalizable, then at least one pk would be the best lottery in data, i.e., it would
be optimal in A1 ∪ A2 ∪ A3. But the critical geometric feature in this figure is that,
for each k, pk is not on a face of C(pk,∪3l=1C(pl, Al)), which is the entire simplex.
Therefore, no pk can be the best lottery in the data. This makes rationalization




























Figure 3·6(b) illustrates a rationalizable dataset. Those three supporting hyper-
planes can be extended to a rationalizing preference % that satisfies p′1  p′2  p′3.
This particular ordering over {p′k}3k=1 reflects the following geometric features in




3) ≡ B3, p′2 is an extreme point of
C(p′2, A
′
2 ∪ B3) ≡ B2, and C(p′1, D′1) is a face of C(p′1, A′1 ∪ B2) ≡ B1. Meanwhile,
Dk ∩ Bl = ∅ for k < l. Our main result formalizes such recursive relations among
observations in data. (Note that, for the dataset in this figure, any rationalizing
preference % must conclude p′1  p′2  p′3.)
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3.4 The Main Result
3.4.1 Geometric Characterization for Rationality
In this section, we provide a characterization for the consistency of a dataset with
maximization of a betweenness preference. We will not only characterize the existence
of a rationalizing preference but also demonstrate how to construct one.
Fix a dataset D = {(Dk, Ak) : k = 1, · · ·K}. To construct a betweenness prefer-
ence to rationalize it, the first step is to find K hyperplanes H1, · · · , HK such that
Hk supports Ak at Dk for every k. Under the constructed preference, Hk ∩∆ will be
the indifference set containing Dk.
It is necessary that Dk is a face of Ak for all k, but this is not sufficient for
the rationalizability. As we argued before, those supporting hyperplanes may not be
consistent with any betweenness preference consistent with the data unless they are
well ordered. In particular, the order of those hyperplanes must respect the ranking
of those chosen lotteries. For instance, if the constructed preference ranks D2 in
between D1 and D3, then H2 must separate ∆∩H1 and ∆∩H3. This suggests that,
in order to find a right set of hyperplanes, we shall fix in advance a ranking over the
chosen lotteries.
Thus, consider first the following joint hypothesis for D:
(H) There exists a betweenness preference % such that
(i) Dk = M(Ak,%) for all k = 1, · · · , K, and
(ii) D1  D2  · · ·  DK .
This hypothesis requires both the rationalizability of D and a prespecified ranking
over {Dk}Kk=1. Later we explain how the analysis extends to provide a characterization
of rationalizability alone.
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For each k, choose a strictly convex combination of all points in Dk and denote




kp for some weights (λ
p
k)p∈Dk such that λ
p
k > 0




k = 1. The choice of weights does not affect the following
analysis.
Define set Bk for k = 1, · · · , K recursively:
BK := C(pK , AK);
Bk := C(pk, C(pk, Ak) ∪Bk+1) ∀ k = 1, · · · , K − 1. (3.1)
Thus, each Bk is a convex cone in ∆, and B1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ BK . Finally, for all k, let
Fk = C(pk, Dk). (3.2)
The next result provides a geometric characterization for the hypothesis H.
Theorem 3.1. Let D = {(Dk, Ak) : k = 1, · · · , K} be a dataset. Define Bk and Fk,
for k = 1, · · ·K, by (1) and (2). Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) There exists a betweenness preference % such that
(a) Dk = M(Ak,%) for all k = 1, · · · , K, and
(b) D1  D2  · · ·  DK .
(ii) (a) Fk is a face of Bk and Fk ∩ Ak = Dk for all k = 1, · · · , K, and
(b) Fk ∩Bl = ∅ for all k < l.
The proof is given in the appendix. Note that if Dk is a singleton {pk}, then the
statement (ii) in Theorem 3.1 reduces to pk being an extreme point of Bk and pk /∈ Bl
for all l > k.
Theorem 3.1 captures the betweenness axiom by transforming the original dataset,
{(Dk, Ak)}Kk=1, into a richer one, {(Fk, Bk)}Kk=1. To see this, first note that if p is better
than q, then the betweenness axiom implies that p is better than r whenever q is a
probability mixture of p and r. Similarly, if p is better than both q1 and q2, then
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p is better than any probability mixture of q1 and q2. Therefore, an implication of
betweenness axiom is that p is optimal in A if and only if p is optimal in C(p,A).
Moreover, C(p,A) is the largest set for such statement to hold: given only p being
optimal in A, any q /∈ C(p,A) could be better than p.
We can further extend such inference under a prespecified ranking over the chosen
lotteries. Suppose that pk is chosen from Ak for k = 1, 2. If we assume that p1 is
better than p2, then by the betweenness axiom, we can infer that p1 would be chosen
from C(p1, A1 ∪ C(p2, A2)). Again, this is the largest set in which p1 is certainly
optimal. A recursive argument yields that {Dk, Ak}Kk=1 passes the joint hypothesis if
and only if {Fk, Bk}Kk=1 does too. In this respect, we fully exploit the betweenness
axiom.
Transforming the dataset facilitates the construction of a rationalizing preference
just as in EU case. We parallel shift all observations to get a single observation and
then find a single supporting hyperplane. To see this, first consider two observations
{(pk, Ak)}2k=1 and assume that p1 is better than p2. Then the indifference set of p2
must separate A2 and the indifference set of p1. Namely, given H1 supporting A1
at p1, we need a hyperplane that supports A2 at p2 and separates H1 ∩ ∆ and A2.
By a separating hyperplane theorem for convex cones (Lemma C.2), such hyperplane
exists if and only if p2 is an extreme point of A2, and H1 and C(p2, A2) are disjoint.
1
But not every hyperplane supporting A1 at p1 meets the latter condition unless it
also supports B1 at p1. Thus, we shall directly work with the transformed dataset.
Figure 3·7 illustrates the construction of a rationalizing preference. Condition
(ii) in Theorem 3.1 ensures that we can recursively construct supporting hyperplanes
H1, · · · , HK that are well ordered in the following way: for any k ∈ {2, · · · , K − 1},
1The most fundamental separating hyperplane theorem states that two disjoint convex sets can
be separated by a hyperplane. Nevertheless, such hyperplane may not exist if we also require it
to support one set at a particular point. Hence we need a stronger condition to guarantee both
separating and supporting.
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Hk separates ∪k−1i=1 (Hi ∩ ∆) and ∪Ki=k+1(Hi ∩ ∆). Then they can be extended to a
complete indifference map of a betweenness preference consistent with the data and
the prespecified ranking over the chosen lotteries.
Given Theorem 3.1, we can test rationalizability alone case by case, where each
case corresponds to a particular ranking over the chosen lotteries. Let D̃ be a dataset.
Let f be a surjective mapping from D̃ to {1, · · · , K} for some K ≤ |D̃|. Define an
indexed dataset Df = {(Dk, Ak) : k = 1, · · · , K} such that
Dk := ∪f((D̃,Ã))=kD̃ and Ak := ∪f((D̃,Ã))=kÃ, ∀ k ∈ {1, · · · , K}. (3.3)
Then we can test hypothesis H for Df . The original dataset D̃ is rationalizable if
and only if there exists one f such that Df passes H. Since D̃ is finite, there are only
finitely many cases. Thus Theorem 3.1 can be used to test rationality alone in finitely
many steps.
3.4.2 EU Rationality and Algebraic Characterization
In this section, we compare our geometric characterization with the one for expected
utility, a special case of betweenness preference. Then we provide an algebraic char-
acterization. Say that a dataset D is EU-rationalizable if there exists an expected
utility preference % such that D = M(A,%) for all (D,A) ∈ D. Note that % is an
expected utility preference if and only if it can be represented by a linear function.
To compare with Theorem 3.1, first consider EU-rationalizability with a prespec-
ified ranking over chosen lotteries.
Proposition 3.1. Let D = {(Dk, Ak) : k = 1, · · · , K} be a dataset. Define Bk and
Fk, for k = 1, · · ·K, by (1) and (2). Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) There exists an expected utility preference % such that
(a) Dk = M(Ak,%) for all k = 1, · · · , K, and





































Figure 3·7: Construct Rationalizing Preferences
(a) Each menu Ak is the set of all extreme points of the dashed-line triangle, and the
chosen lotteries Dk are those filled circles.
(b) Construct Bk recursively. Each Bk is a convex cone in the simplex, and B1 ⊃ B2 ⊃
B3. Note that D1 contains two points and so p1 is chosen to be any point in between
them. Then F1 = q1r1, F2 = {p2} and F3 = {p3}.
(c) Pick H1 to support B1 at F1. Then pick H2 to support B2 at F2 and to separate
I1 and B2 \ F2. This ensures that I1 ∩ I2 = ∅.
(d) Pick H3 to support B3 at F3 and to separate I1 ∪ I2 and B3 \ F3. Then H2
must separate I1 and I3. This allows us to extend from I1, I2, I3 to a rationalizing
preference. In this example, H1, H2 and H3 intersect at x. So we can simply rotate
hyperplanes around x and let preference increase counterclockwise.
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(ii) (a) F ≡ ∪Kk=1(Fk + p1 − pk) is a face of B ≡ ∪Kk=1(Bk + p1 − pk),
(b) Fk ∩ Ak = Dk for all k = 1, · · · , K, and
(c) Fk ∩Bl = ∅ for all k < l.
Proof. (i)⇒ (ii): Let h be a linear function representing %. For all k, Fk = M(Bk, h)
and so Fk+p1−pk = M(Bk+p1−pk). Since p1 ∈ Fk+p1−pk for all k, F = M(B, h).
Hence F is a face of B. The conditions (b) and (c) in (ii) follow from the same
argument in the proof of Theorem 3.1.
(ii) ⇒ (i): Since F is a face of B, there exists a linear function h such that
F = M(B, h). Thus, for each k, Fk + p1− pk = M(Bk + p1− pk, h). Since h is linear,
Fk = M(Bk, h). Since Fk ∩ Ak = Dk and Ak ⊂ Bk, Dk = M(Ak, h). For any k < l,
since Fk ∩ Bl = ∅ and Bl ⊂ Bk, Fl ⊂ Bk \ Fk, implying that h(Fk) > h(Fl). Hence
the EU preference % represented by h satisfies the conditions (a) and (b) in (i).
To see how the characterization in Proposition 3.1 is stronger than the one in
Theorem 3.1, note that ∪Kk=1(Fk + p1 − pk) being a face of ∪Ki=1(Bi + p1 − pi) implies
that Fk is a face of Bk for all k, but the converse is false.
All indifference sets of an expected utility preference are parallel. This implies that
we are free to “shift” observations; that is, we can replace (Dk, Ak) by (Dk+x,Ak+x)
with any x ∈ RN . In fact, we can suitably shift each (D,A) ∈ D until all observa-
tions can be combined into a single observation (it does not matter if we go outside
the simplex after shifting). Therefore, EU-rationalizability, without presuming any
ranking over the chosen lotteries, permits a relatively simple characterization.
Proposition 3.2. Let D = {(Dk, Ak) : k = 1, · · · , K} be a dataset. Take any qk ∈ Dk
for each k = 1, · · · , K. Let A = ∪Kk=1(Ak + q1 − qk), and D = ∪Kk=1(Dk + q1 − qk).
Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) D is EU-rationalizable.
(ii) D is a face of A.
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii): Since D is EU-rationalizable, there exists a linear function h such
that Dk = M(Ak, h) for all k. Since h is linear, Dk = M(Ak, h) implies that Dk +
q1 − qk = M(Ak + q1 − qk, h). Since q1 ∈ Dk + q1 − qk for all k, D = M(A, h). Hence
D is a face of A.
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(ii) ⇒ (i): Since D is a face of A, there exists a linear function h such that
D = M(A, h). Thus, for each k, Dk + q1− qk = M(Ak + q1− qk, h). Since h is linear,
Dk = M(Ak, h) for all k. Hence D is EU-rationalizable.
We derive an algebraic characterization based on the one for EU-rationality. Note
that every hyperplane supporting Ak at Dk defines an EU preference. Thus, finding
a set of supporting hyperplanes is equivalent to finding a set of EU preferences. In
other words, testing the joint hypothesis H is equivalent to testing EU-rationality K
times for K different datasets.
Because every menu is assumed finite, extBk (the set of all extreme points of Bk)
is finite for all k = 1, · · · , K.
Suppose that the dataset {(Dk, Ak)}Kk=1 passes the joint hypothesis H. There exists
a betweenness preference % such that, for every k, Dk = M(Ak,%) and Dk  Bk+1.
The indifference set of Dk defines an EU preference under which Dk is the set of all
optimal lotteries in Ak, and every lottery in Dk is strictly better than every lottery
in extBk+1. Therefore, for every k, the dataset
{(Dk, Ak), (Dk \ extBk+1, Dk ∪ extBk+1)}
is EU-rationalizable. The converse is also true: if all K datasets are EU-rationalizable,
then the original dataset passes the joint hypothesis.
An algebraic characterization follows from the definition of face in convexity the-
ory. If D is a face of A, then no convex combination of points in D can be expressed
as a convex combination of points in A with positive weight on some point in A \D.
This is essentially the characterization for EU-rationality in the literature: by com-
pounding rejected lotteries, there is no way to replicate a lottery that is compounded
of chosen lotteries (Fishburn, 1975; Kim, 1996).
We obtain an alternative characterization for the joint hypothesis H.
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Theorem 3.1’. Let D = {(Dk, Ak) : k = 1, · · · , K} be a dataset. Define Bk for
k = 1, · · ·K by (1). Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) There exists a betweenness preference % such that
(a) Dk = M(Ak,%) for all k = 1, · · · , K, and
(b) D1  D2  · · ·  DK .
(ii) For all k = 1, · · · , K, the dataset {(Dk, Ak), (Dk \ extBk+1, Dk ∪ extBk+1)} is
EU-rationalizable.
(iii) Fix any k = 1, · · · , K. Let {(si, ti)}mi=1 = Dk × [(Ak \ Dk) ∪ extBk+1] and
{(si, ti)}ni=m+1 = Dk×Dk. There does not exist a probability vector (λ1, · · · , λn)







Proof. Fix k. Suppose that Fk is a face of Bk, Fk∩Bk+1 = ∅ and Fk∩Ak = Dk. Then
there exists a hyperplane H that supports Ak∪Bk+1 at Dk and does not intersect with
Bk+1. Then there exists an affine function h representing H such that Dk = M(Ak, h)
and Dk \ extBk+1 = M(Dk ∪ extBk+1, h). This function h represents a EU preference
that rationalizes {(Dk, Ak), (Dk \ extBk+1, Dk ∪ extBk+1)}.
Suppose that {(Dk, Ak), (Dk \ extBk+1, Dk ∪ extBk+1)} is EU-rational. Let affine
function h represent a consistent EU preference. Then h(p) = h(q) > h(r) for all
p, q ∈ Dk and r ∈ (Ak \Dk) ∪ extBk+1. Hence Fk = M(Bk, h) and so Fk is a face of
Bk. Moreover, h(p) > h(r) for all p ∈ Fk and r ∈ Bk+1, implying that Fk ∩Bk+1 = ∅.
Thus, the statement (ii) is equivalent to the statements in Theorem 3.1.
The equivalence between (ii) and (iii) is established in Kim (1996).
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Appendix A
Appendix of Chapter 1
A.1 Proofs
A.1.1 Preliminaries
Each menu F ∈ K is a finite set of acts. The convex-combination operation on menus
is defined as αF + (1 − α)G ≡ {αf + (1 − α)g : f ∈ F, g ∈ G}. Given u : ∆X → R






p · (u ◦ f)π(dp)
denote the expected utility gain from menu F given the information structure π ∈
Π(p̄). Note that the mapping 〈·, ·〉 : K × Π(p̄) → R is bilinear. Moreover, given
c : Π(p̄)→ [0,∞], let
V (F ) = max
π∈Π(p̄)
〈F, π〉 − c(π),
and
I(F ) = arg max
π∈Π(p̄)
〈F, π〉 − c(π).
Let ch(F ) denote the convex hull of F . It is straightforward to show that 〈F, π〉 =
〈ch(F ), π〉, V (F ) = V (ch(F )), and I(F ) = I(ch(F )) (extend their domains to include
convex hulls of menus). Define a distance function dp on K such that dp(F,G) =
dH(ch(F ), ch(G)), where dH is the standard Hausdorff metric. Note that dp is a
pseudometric on K.1
1dp deviates from the standard metric by the fact that dp(F,G) = 0 does not imply F = G.
63
We would like to view K and Π(p̄) as a dual pair; however, K is not a (subset
of a) vector space. Instead, let Kc := {ch(F ) : F ∈ K}. Endowed with Hausdorff
metric, Kc has a convex-like structure.2 By Capraro and Fritz (2013, Theorem 9) , Kc
affinely and isometrically embeds into a convex subset of a Banach space. Therefore
we can view Kc and Π(p̄) as a dual pair.3
A.1.2 Proof of Lemma 1.1
We need the following lemmas for proving Lemma 1.1. They overcome the issue of
differentiability so that the Envelope Theorem can be applied.








p · (u ◦ f)π(dp), (A.1)
where
ρπF (A) := π
{
p ∈ ∆(S) : A ∩ arg max
f ′∈F
p · (u ◦ f ′) 6= φ
}
.
Proof. See Lu (2016).
Lemma A.2. For any F ∈ K and π ∈ ∆(∆S), 〈F ∪ fa, π〉a := ∂∂a〈F ∪ f
a, π〉 exists
and
〈F ∪ fa, π〉a = ρπF∪fa(F )− 1
for almost all a ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, for all π ∈ ∆(∆S) and a ∈ (0, 1),
〈F ∪ fa, π〉a+ := lim
a′→a+
〈F ∪ fa′ , π〉 − 〈F ∪ fa, π〉
a′ − a
and
〈F ∪ fa, π〉a− := lim
a′→a−
〈F ∪ fa′ , π〉 − 〈F ∪ fa, π〉
a′ − a
2See Capraro and Fritz (2013) for the definition of convex-like structures. Roughly, if a metric
space has a convex-like structure, a convex-combination operation is defined on this space. Addition-









n αn = 1 and αn ≥ 0 ∀ n. Hausdorff metric based on Euclidean distance satisfies this axiom.
3Π(p̄) is a subset of the linear space of finite signed measures on ∆(S), endowed with the weak
topology.
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(the right and left partial derivatives with respect to a) both exist, and 〈F∪fa, π〉a+ ≥
〈F ∪ fa, π〉a−.





a)db. When b > a, ρπ
F∪fa∪fb(F∪
fa) = 1 since fa dominates f b. When b < a, fa is never optimal and so it can be
removed from the menu without changing the choice probabilities. Therefore,









ρπF∪fb(F )db+ 1− a.
It follows that 〈F ∪ fa, π〉 is almost everywhere differentiable with respect to a, and
∂
∂a
〈F ∪ fa, π〉 = ρπF∪fa(F ) − 1. In addition, it has right and left limits everywhere
and the right limit must be greater than the left limit since ρπ
F∪fb(F ) is increasing in
b. Thus, the right and left derivatives of 〈F ∪ fa, π〉 exist, and the right derivative is





Lemma A.2 says that for a given π, 〈F ∪ fa, π〉a does not exist only on a set of
measure 0, but that set can vary with π. Hence, for an arbitrary collection {π(a) ∈
∆(∆S)}a∈(0,1), it may not be true that 〈F ∪ fa, π〉a |π=π(a) exists almost everywhere.
Nevertheless, the next lemma shows that if for each a, π(a) is chosen to be the optimal
information structure for F ∪ fa, then that derivative exists almost everywhere.
Lemma A.3. For any collection {πF∪fa ∈ ∆(∆S)}a∈(0,1) such that
πF∪fa ∈ arg max
π∈Π(p̄)
{〈F ∪ fa, π〉 − c(π)}
for all a ∈ (0, 1),
〈F ∪ fa, πF∪fa〉a :=
∂〈F ∪ fa, π〉
∂a
|π=πF∪fa
does not exist only on a countable set, implying that it exists for almost all a ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. By Lemma A.2, for every a ∈ (0, 1),
〈F ∪ fa, πF∪fa〉a+ := lim
a′→a+




〈F ∪ fa, πF∪fa〉a− := lim
a′→a−
〈F ∪ fa′ , πF∪fa〉 − 〈F ∪ fa, πF∪fa〉
a′ − a
both exist, and 〈F ∪ fa, πF∪fa〉a+ ≥ 〈F ∪ fa, πF∪fa〉a−. Let A = {a ∈ (0, 1) :
〈F ∪ fa, πF∪fa〉a+ > 〈F ∪ fa, πF∪fa〉a−}. We want to show that A is countable.
For each a ∈ A, choose a rational number ra such that 〈F ∪ fa, πF∪fa〉a+ > ra >
〈F ∪ fa, πF∪fa〉a−. Then choose rational numbers sa ∈ (0, a) and ta ∈ (a, 1) closed
enough to a such that
〈F ∪ f b, πF∪fa〉 − 〈F ∪ fa, πF∪fa〉
b− a
< ra if b ∈ (sa, a)
and
〈F ∪ f b, πF∪fa〉 − 〈F ∪ fa, πF∪fa〉
b− a
> ra if b ∈ (a, ta).
Combining these two inequalities, we obtain
〈F ∪ f b, πF∪fa〉 − 〈F ∪ fa, πF∪fa〉 > ra(b− a) (A.2)
for all b ∈ (sa, ta) and b 6= a. Now we get a mapping ψ from A to a countable set Q3
such that ψ(a) = (ra, sa, ta). We claim that ψ is a one-to-one mapping. Suppose that
we have distinct a1 and a2 in A with ψ(a1) = ψ(a2). Then a1 and a2 are both in the
interval (sa1 , ta1) = (sa2 , ta2). Taking a = a1 and b = a2 into (A.2) yields
〈F ∪ fa2 , πF∪fa1 〉 − 〈F ∪ fa1 , πF∪fa1 〉 > ra1(a2 − a1).
Similarly, taking a = a2 and b = a1 into (A.2) yields
〈F ∪ fa1 , πF∪fa2 〉 − 〈F ∪ fa2 , πF∪fa2 〉 > ra2(a1 − a2).
Since ra1 = ra2 , adding these two inequalities yields
〈F ∪ fa1 , πF∪fa2 〉+ 〈F ∪ fa2 , πF∪fa1 〉 > 〈F ∪ fa1 , πF∪fa1 〉+ 〈F ∪ fa2 , πF∪fa2 〉.
But this contradicts to the fact that πF∪fa1 and πF∪fa2 are optimal for F ∪ fa1 and
F ∪ fa2 respectively. It is because
〈F ∪ fa1 , πF∪fa1 〉 − c(πF∪fa1 ) ≥ 〈F ∪ fa1 , πF∪fa2 〉 − c(πF∪fa2 )
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and
〈F ∪ fa2 , πF∪fa2 〉 − c(πF∪fa2 ) ≥ 〈F ∪ fa2 , πF∪fa1 〉 − c(πF∪fa1 )
must hold. Adding them up, we see that the total gross benefits from these two
menus cannot be increased after exchanging their underlying information structures.
Hence, ψ must be one-to-one, implying that A is countable.
The fact that A is countable implies that 〈F ∪ fa, πF∪fa〉a+ and 〈F ∪ fa, πF∪fa〉a−
differ at a set of measure 0. Consequently, 〈F ∪fa, πF∪fa〉a exists almost everywhere.4
Now we are ready to prove Lemma 1.1.
Step 1: First we want to show that V (F ∪ fa) is absolutely continuous in a;
thus, it is differentiable almost everywhere and can be expressed as an integral of its
derivative with respect to a. According to Theorem 2 in Milgrom and Segal (2002),
it suffices to show that for all π ∈ ∆(∆S),
(i) 〈F ∪ fa, π〉 − c(π) is absolutely continuous in a.
(ii) | ∂
∂a
[〈F ∪ fa, π〉 − c(π)]| is bounded above by some integrable function b(a) for
almost all a.
Take any a1, a2 ∈ [0, 1] with a1 < a2. For every p ∈ ∆S, consider two numbers
maxf∈F∪fa1 p · (u ◦ f) and maxf∈F∪fa2 p · (u ◦ f). They are equal when fa1 and fa2
are not maximizers respectively. The former equals 1− a1 when fa1 is a maximizer.
The latter equals 1− a2 when fa2 is a maximizer, and it is greater than 1− a2 when
fa2 is not a maximizer. It is impossible that fa1 is not a maximizer but fa2 is since
fa1 dominates fa2 . Hence,
max
f∈F∪fa1
p · (u ◦ f)− max
f∈F∪fa2
p · (u ◦ f) ≤ a2 − a1.
4The trick in the proof of Lemma A.3 can be found in Hewitt and Stromberg (1965). See
their Theorem 17.9, which states that for an arbitrary real-valued function defined on an open
interval there exist only countably many points where left and right derivatives both exist and
differ. Lemma A.3 does not follow directly from that theorem because for different a the partial
derivative is evaluated at different π. It is crucial that information structures are chosen optimally.
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For any π ∈ ∆(∆S), integrating both sides with respect to π yields
〈F ∪ fa1 , π〉 − 〈F ∪ fa2 , π〉 ≤ a2 − a1.
It follows that 〈F ∪ fa, π〉 − c(π) is Lipschitz continuous in a and so it is absolutely
continuous. Thus, (i) holds.
By Lemma A.2, for any π ∈ Π(p̄),∣∣∣∣ ∂∂a〈F ∪ fa, π〉
∣∣∣∣ = 1− ρπF∪fa(F ) ≤ 1
for almost all a. Thus (ii) holds. We conclude that V (F ∪fa) is absolutely continuous
in a. Therefore, it is differentiable almost everywhere, and





V (F ∪ f t)dt. (A.3)
Step 2: By the Envelope Theorem (Milgrom and Segal, 2002, Theorem 1), when-
ever 〈F ∪ fa, πF∪fa〉a and ddaV (F ∪ f
a) both exist, they are equal. By Lemma A.3,
the former exists almost everywhere. The latter also exists almost everywhere as
V (F ∪ fa) is absolutely continuous. Hence, for almost all a ∈ [0, 1],
d
da
V (F ∪ fa) = ∂
∂a
〈F ∪ fa, πF∪fa〉 = ρF∪fa(F )− 1.










V (F ∪ fa)
)
da = 1 + V (F ∪ f 1)− V (F ∪ f 0).
Note that f 0 is the best outcome x̄. It is always optimal in F ∪f 0 regardless of belief,
and so the optimal information is the one with the smallest cost (this cost is 0 by
the normalization of c). Thus V (F ∪ f 0) = 1. On the other hand, f 1 is the worst
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outcome x, and so it is never optimal. Thus, V (F ∪ f 1) = V (F ). Consequently,∫ 1
0
ρF∪fa(F )da = V (F ). This completes the proof of Lemma 1.1.
A.1.3 Proof of Theorem 1.2




















Claim 1: ĉ is canonical, and c(π) ≥ ĉ(π) for all π ∈ Π(p̄).





ρF∪fa(F )da = 〈F, p̄〉 − max
π∈Π(p̄)
{〈F, π〉 − c(π)} ≤ 0
for all F ∈ K. Therefore ĉ(p̄) ≤ 0. Note that for any singleton menu {f}, the
optimal information must be the one having the smallest cost. Therefore, 〈{f}, p̄〉 −∫ 1
0
ρf∪fa(f)da = 0, and so ĉ(p̄) = 0.









p · (u ◦ f)π2(dp)













Hence, ĉ(π1) ≥ ĉ(π2).
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Take any π, π′ and α ∈ (0, 1). Note that
























〈F, π〉 − 1∫
0
ρF∪fa(F )da
+ (1− α) supF∈K





Thus, ĉ(απ + (1− α)π′) ≤ αĉ(π) + (1− α)ĉ(π′). So ĉ is convex. We conclude that ĉ
is a canonical information cost function.
Suppose that there exists π̃ ∈ Π(p̄) such that c(π̃) < ĉ(π̃). By the definition of ĉ,
there exists a menu F such that





〈F, π̃〉 − c(π̃) > max
π∈Π(p̄)
{〈F, π〉 − c(π)} .
This is a contradiction. So c ≥ ĉ.
Claim 2: ρ is rationalized by (u, p̄, ĉ).
Proof. It suffices to show that for every F , any optimal information structure under
c is also optimal under ĉ. By Lemma 1.1, ĉ(π) = supF ′∈K[〈F ′, π〉 − V (F ′)], where
V (F ′) = maxπ∈Π(p̄)〈F ′, π〉 − c(π).
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First we claim that for every F ∈ K and any πF ∈ arg maxπ∈Π(p̄)〈F, π〉 − c(π),
sup
F ′∈K
[〈F ′, πF 〉 − V (F ′)] = 〈F, πF 〉 − V (F ). (A.4)
Assume that there exits F̃ such that 〈F̃ , πF 〉 − V (F̃ ) > 〈F, πF 〉 − V (F ). Note that
the right-hand side is just c(πF ). Thus, 〈F̃ , πF 〉 − c(πF ) > V (F̃ ), a contradiction. So
(A.4) holds.
From (A.4), V (F ) = 〈F, πF 〉−ĉ(πF ). By the definition of ĉ, for any other π ∈ Π(p̄),
ĉ(π) ≥ 〈F, π〉 − V (F ). It follows that
〈F, πF 〉 − ĉ(πF ) ≥ 〈F, π〉 − ĉ(π).
Therefore,
πF ∈ arg max
π∈Π(p̄)
〈F, π〉 − ĉ(π).
Consequently, ρ is rationalized by (u, p̄, ĉ).
Claim 3: For every π ∈ Π(p̄), if there exists a menu F such that







p · (u ◦ f)π′(dp)− c(π′)
 ,
then ĉ(π) = c(π).
Proof. When π is optimal for some menu F under c, ĉ(π) = 〈F, π〉 − V (F ) by (A.4).
It follows that ĉ(π) = c(π).
A.1.4 Proof of Proposition 1.1
Suppose that π has n possible realizations and F contains m acts with m > n. If
under π there are m− n acts in F which are never optimal, then remove them from
F , obtaining a new menu F ′ which has n acts. Since those removed acts are never
optimal, 〈F, π〉 = 〈F ′, π〉. If F has n + k acts which are possibly optimal under π,
where k > 0, then by the pigeonhole principle there must exist one act which is not
the unique optimal act under any possible realizations. Then remove that act from
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F . We can repeat such process until we get a new menu F ′ containing n acts such
that 〈F, π〉 = 〈F ′, π〉.






ρF∪fa(F )da. Thus, removing all menus containing more than n
acts will not lower the supremum in (1.5). This completes the proof.
A.1.5 Proof of Theorem 1.3
Suppose that ρi is rationalized by (ui, p̄i, ci), for i = 1, 2. We want to show that the
following three statements are equivalent:












ρ2f∪f2,a(f)da for all f ∈ F .
(iii) u1 = u2, p̄1 = p̄2, and ĉ1 ≤ ĉ2.
Let V i(F ) = maxπ∈Π(p̄i){〈F, π〉i − ci(π)}. By Lemma 1.1,
∫ 1
0
ρiF∪f i,a(F )da = V
i(F )
Note that V i(f) = p̄i · (ui ◦ f) and V i(f i,a) = 1− a.
[(i)⇒(ii)]: Since ρ2 reveals higher information cost than ρ1, V 2(g) ≥ V 2(f) implies
that V 1(g) ≥ V 1(f) for all f, g ∈ F . We claim that V 1 and V 2 define the same
subjective expected utility preference over acts. To see this, it suffices to show that
V 2(g) > V 2(f) implies that V 1(g) > V 1(f). Suppose instead that V 2(g) > V 1(f) but
V 1(g) = V 1(f). Consider two cases. First, V 1(f) > V 1(δx1). There exists λ ∈ (0, 1)
large enough such that V 2(λg+ (1−λ)δx1) ≥ V 2(f). However, V 1(λg+ (1−λ)δx1) <
V 1(f), a contradiction. Second, V 1(δx̄1) > V
1(f). There exists γ ∈ (0, 1) large enough
such that V 2(g) ≥ V 2(γf + (1 − γ)δx̄1). However, V 1(g) < V 1(γf + (1 − γ)δx̄1), a
contradiction. Therefore V 1 and V 2 induce the same preference over acts. Thus,
p̄1 = p̄2 and u1 = u2. It follows that V
1(f) = V 2(f) for all act f .
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Note that ρ1 and ρ2 have the same best and worst prizes. Thus we can assume
f 1,a = f 2,a ≡ fa. Suppose that V 1(F ) < V 2(F ) for some menu F . Let 1 − a ∈
(V 1(F ), V 2(F )). Then V 2(F ) > V 2(fa) = 1 − a but V 1(F ) < V 1(fa) = 1 − a. This
contradicts to (i). Hence V 1(F ) ≥ V 2(F ) for all F ∈ K. Condition (ii) holds.
[(ii)⇒(iii)]: Since V 1(f) = V 2(f) for all act f , they defines the same subjective
expected utility preference over acts. It follows that p̄1 = p̄2 and u1 = u2. Thus
Π(p̄1) = Π(p̄2) and 〈F, π〉1 = 〈F, π〉2. Then, by the fact that V 1(F ) ≥ V 2(F ) for all
menu F , it is straightforward to show that ĉ1 ≤ ĉ2. Condition (iii) holds.
[(iii)⇒(i)]: By Theorem 1.2, ρi is rationalized by (ui, p̄i, ĉi). By Lemma 1.1,
V i(F ) = maxπ∈Π(p̄i){〈F, π〉i − ĉi(π)}. Then (iii) implies that V 1(f) = V 2(f) for all
act f , and V 1(F ) ≥ V 2(F ) for all menu F . Hence, whenever V 2(F ) ≥ V 2(f), it must
be that V 1(F ) ≥ V 1(f). Condition (i) holds. This completes the proof.
A.1.6 Proof of Proposition 1.2
Suppose that ρ is rationalizable by (u, p̄, c). We first prove a lemma showing that ρ
satisfies a property which is stronger than CI.
Lemma A.4. Suppose that ρ is rationalizable by (u, p̄, c). Let F = {f1, · · · , fn}. Let
G = {g1, · · · , gn} be such that for all i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, u ◦ gi = (u ◦ fi) + ri for some










where rB = min{ri : gi ∈ B and ri ≤ rj ∀ j s.t. gj ∈ B} and r̄A = max{ri : fi ∈
A and ri ≥ rj ∀ j s.t. fj ∈ A}.
Proof. Let πF and πG be the optimal information structures inducing ρF and ρG
respectively. Then











To see why the second inequality holds, suppose that given πF , we choose from G as
if we were facing F : when the posterior determines A as the set of all optimal acts
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in F , choose gi from G where i is such that fi ∈ A and ri ≥ rj for all j such that




F (A), which is
less than 〈G, πF 〉 because the latter is the expected utility when we choose optimally
under each posterior.
Similarly, we have





















In the case where r1 > 0 and ri = 0 for all i > 1, Lemma A.4 says that r1ρ
∗
G(g1) =




F (A). Therefore, (1 − ρG(G \ g1)) ≥
ρF (f1). This proves CI.
Next, consider IDD and INCA. It is straightforward to show that I(αF +(1−α)g)
does not depend on g. If this set is a singleton, then it is necessary that the underlying
information structure remains the same as g is replaced by h, and so IDD follows.
If ρF (g) = 0, then it must be that V (F \ g) = V (F ). So π ∈ I(F \ g) implies that
π ∈ I(F ). If I(F ) is a singleton, the underlying information structures for F and
F \ g are the same, and so INCA follows.
Lemma A.5 below shows that I(·) on Kc is generically single-valued. Thus, I(·)
is generically single-valued on K (with respect to the pseudometric dp). This proves
that IDD and INCA hold generically.
Lemma A.5. Let I : Kc ⇒ Π(p̄) be such that I(F ) = arg maxπ∈Π(p̄)〈F, π〉 − c(π) for
all F ∈ Kc. Then I is single-valued almost everywhere. That is, the set {F ∈ Kc :
I(F ) has more than one element} is of the first category in Kc.
Proof. The value function V is continuous by the Maximum theorem. It is also convex
74
because
V (αF + (1− α)G) = max
π∈Π(p̄)
{〈αF + (1− α)G, π〉 − c(π)}
= max
π∈Π(p̄)
{α [〈F, π〉 − c(π)] + (1− α) [〈G, π〉 − c(π)]}
≤ α max
π∈Π(p̄)
{〈F, π〉 − c(π)}+ (1− α) max
π∈Π(p̄)
{〈G, π〉 − c(π)} = αV (F ) + (1− α)V (G).
We claim that the subdifferential ∂V (F ) equals to I(F ) for all F ∈ Kc. Let π ∈
∂V (F ). By the definition of subdifferential,
〈F ′ − F, π〉 ≤ V (F ′)− V (F ) ∀ F ′ ∈ Kc.
Rearranging and taking supremum yields
sup
F ′∈K
{〈F ′, π〉 − V (F ′)} = c(π) ≤ 〈F, π〉 − V (F ).
Hence V (F ) ≤ 〈F, π〉− c(π). So π ∈ I(F ). On the other hand, if π ∈ I(F ), reversing
the argument yields π ∈ ∂V (F ). Therefore ∂V (F ) = I(F ).
By Rockafellar (1970, Theorem A), I is a maximal monotone operator from Kc to
Π(p̄). Then by Kenderov (1975, Theorem 2.7), I is single-valued almost everywhere
on Kc.
A.1.7 Proof of Proposition 1.3
Suppose that ρ is rationalized by (u, p̄, c). It is straightforward to verify that if c(π) =
0 or ∞ for every π ∈ Π(p̄), then the optimal information structure for αF + (1−α)g
does not depend on α. Thus, Linearity follows.
For simplicity, let Vρ(F ) :=
∫ 1
0
ρF∪fa(F )da and αF := αF + (1−α)δx for all menu
F . Recall that x is the worst outcome.
For the converse, we first claim that Linearity implies that Vρ(αF ) = αVρ(F ) for
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′ = αVρ(F ).
Let ĉ be the smallest information cost function. Fix a menu F and α ∈ (0, 1).
Suppose that the information structure παF is acquired for αF . Then
ĉ(παF ) = 〈αF, παF 〉 − Vρ(αF ) = α[〈F, παF 〉 − Vρ(F )] ≥ 〈F, παF 〉 − Vρ(F ).
Since α < 1, ĉ(παF ) = 0. Moreover, παF is also optimal for F , and it induces ρF
because ρ satisfies Linearity. We conclude that for every menu F , there exists an
optimal information structure which has zero cost and induces ρF . Hence ρ can be
rationalized by (u, p̄, c) for some c such that c(π) ∈ {0,∞} for all π ∈ Π(p̄).
A.1.8 Proof of Proposition 1.4
Suppose that ρ is rationalizable. Without loss of generality, we assume here that the
payoff of an act is measured in utils. That is, each act is a mapping f : S → R+,
and p · (u ◦ f) = p · f for all p ∈ ∆S. Then each act can be identified as an element
of RS, and a menu is a finite subset of RS. A constant act paying r in every state is
denoted by r.
By Lemma 1.1, V (F ) =
∫∞
0
ρF∪r(F )dr. In general, V (·) is convex. We will argue
that when ρ∗ satisfies Monotonicity, V (·) is in fact linear. Hence it satisfies all the
axioms of the subjective-learning representation (Dillenberger et al., 2014). That is,
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there exists π∗ ∈ Π(p̄) such that









In other words, π∗ is optimal for all menus. This completes the proof.
To show that V is linear, we first express V (αF + (1− α)G) as






V (α(F ∪ r) + (1− α)(G ∪ r))
]
dr.
A basic relationship between ex-ante valuation and ex-post random choice, by the
envelope theorem, is that d
dr
V (F ∪ {f + r}) = ρF∪{f+r}(f + r). Based on this, it is
straightforward to show that
1− d
dr
V (α(F ∪ r) + (1− α)(G ∪ r)) = αρα(F∪r)+(1−α)(G∪r)(αF + (1− α)(G ∪ r))
+ (1− α)ρα(F∪r)+(1−α)(G∪r)(α(F ∪ r) + (1− α)G).
We will show that with Monotonicity,
∞∫
0
ρα(F∪r)+(1−α)(G∪r)(αF + (1− α)(G ∪ r))dr =
∞∫
0
ρF∪r(F )dr = V (F ),
and similar for another term. Thus, V (αF + (1− α)G) = αV (F ) + (1− α)V (G).
Note that if ρ is rationalizable, then it satisfies Extremeness: ρ∗F (A) > 0 only if
A is a face of F .5 Let F(F ) denote the set of all non-empty faces of F . In addition,




for all F,A ⊂ F, g, g′.
The following lemma shows that if ρ∗ also satisfies Monotonicity, then it satisfies
Linearity: ρ∗αF+(1−α)g(αA+ (1− α)g) = ρ∗F (A) for any α ∈ (0, 1).
5Say that A ⊂ F is a face of F if (i) for all h ∈ ch(A) and h′, h′′ ∈ ch(F ), if h = αh′ + (1− α)h′′
for some α ∈ (0, 1) then {h′, h′′} ⊂ ch(A), and (ii) A = ch(A) ∩ F .
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Lemma A.6. If ρ∗ satisfies Extremeness, Independence of Degenerate Decision and
Monotonicity, then ρ∗ satisfies Linearity.
Proof. Suppose that Linearity does not hold. There exist F , A ⊂ F , α ∈ (0, 1) and
g such that ρ∗F (A) > ρ
∗
αA+(1−α)g(αA+ (1− α)g). Let f belong to the relative interior
of chA. By IDD, ρ∗F (A) > ρ
∗
αF+(1−α)f (αA+ (1−α)f). Let H = F ∪ (αF + (1−α)f).
Note that extH = extF . Extremeness and Monotonicity imply that ρ∗H(A ∪ (αA +
(1 − α)f)) = ρ∗F (A). Hence ρ∗H(A ∪ (αA + (1 − α)f)) > ρ∗αF+(1−α)f (αA + (1 − α)f).
However, this violates Monotonicity because H ⊃ αF+(1−α)f . Therefore, Linearity
must hold.
Fix any menu F and A ⊂ F . Pick any h in the relative interior of chA. Define
co(A,F ) := h+
{∑
f∈F
λf (f − h) : λf ≥ 0 ∀ f ∈ F
}
.
Note that the choice of h does not matter. When A is a face of F , co(A,F ) is the
intersection of all half-spaces that contain F and are tangent to F at a face containing
A. With Monotonicity, the choice probability of A completely depends on co(A,F ).
Lemma A.7. Suppose that ρ∗ satisfies Extremeness, Independence of Degenerate
Decision and Monotonicity. If co(A,F ) ⊂ co(A,G), then ρ∗F (A) ≥ ρ∗G(A).
Proof. Suppose that co(A,F ) ⊂ co(A,G). Pick h from the relative interior of chA.
Then aF + (1 − a)h ⊂ ch(G) when a is small enough. By Extremeness and Mono-
tonicity, ρ∗aF+(1−a)h(aA + (1 − a)h) ≥ ρ∗G∪(aF+(1−a)h)(A ∪ (aA + (1 − a)h)) = ρ∗G(A).
By Linearity, ρ∗F (A) = ρ
∗
aF+(1−a)h(aA+ (1− a)h). Therefore ρ∗F (A) ≥ ρ∗G(A).
Note that ρ∗ also satisfies Dominance: if {f, g} ⊂ F and f < g, then ρ∗F (A) = 0
whenever f ∈ A. The next lemma shows that, with Monotonicity, the marginal choice
from F out of F +G does not depend on G.
Lemma A.8. If ρ∗ satisfies Monotonicity, IDD, Extremeness, and Dominance, then
ρ∗F+G(A+ F(G)) = ρ∗F (A) for any F , A ⊂ F , and G.
Proof. Fix F , G, and A ⊂ F . Because of Extremeness, Dominance, and Monotonicity,
it suffices to consider the case where A ∈ F(F ), F = extF , and F is full-dimensional.
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Note that if F were not full-dimensional, we could add dominated acts into F to
increase its dimension without changing the choice probability of A.
We can describe ch(F ) as the intersection of a finite number of half-spaces that
are tangent to ch(F ) at a S− 1 dimensional face of ch(F ). That is, ch(F ) = ∩Jj=1K−j
where each K−j is defined by
K−j = {x ∈ RS : x · vj ≤ rj}
for some vj ∈ RS and rj ∈ R. Let Kj = {x ∈ RS : x · vj = rj}. Then Kj ∩ F is a
S − 1 dimensional face of F for all j.
For every j, let r̄j = maxh∈F+Gvj · h. Let K̄j = {x ∈ RS : vj · x = r̄j} and
K̄−j = {x ∈ RS : vj · x ≤ r̄j}. Then F + G ⊂ ∩jK̄−j . Because F is full-dimensional,
∩jK̄−j is a linear transformation of ∩jK−j . That is, ext(∩jK̄−j ) = aF + h̄ for some
a > 0 and h̄ ∈ RS. By Linearity, ρ∗
aF+h̄
(aA+ h̄) = ρ∗F (A).
Let H = (aA + h̄) ∪ (F + G) and Ā = ch(aA + h̄) ∩ H. Then co(Ā,H) =
co(aA + h̄, aF + h̄). This is because co(aA + h̄, aF + h̄) = ∩j:K̄j⊃ch(Ā)K̄
−
j , and every
K̄j supports F +g at a S−1 dimensional face for some g ∈ G. Thus, ρ∗H(Ā) = ρ∗F (A).
Let B be a face of G. If A + B is not a face of H, then ρ∗H(A + B) = 0 by
Extremeness. If A + B is a face of H, then there exists v ∈ RS such that A + B =
arg maxh∈H v ·h. Moreover, A = arg maxf∈F v ·f , and so aA+h̄ = arg maxf∈aF+h̄ v ·f .
Because H ⊂ ch(aF + h̄), A+ B = Ā. Therefore, B is unique and equal to {g ∈ G :
A+ g ⊂ ch(Ā)}.
If A + B is not a face of H for all B ∈ F(G), then ρ∗F+G(A + F(G)) ≤ ρ∗H(Ā) by
Monotonicity. If A + B is a face of H for some B ∈ F(G), then ρ∗F+G(A + F(G)) =
ρ∗H(Ā).







F (A) = 1. Thus, ρ
∗
F+G(A+ F(G)) = ρ∗F (A) for
all A ∈ F(F ).
Linearity and Lemma A.8 imply that ραF+(1−αG)(αA+ (1− α)G) = ρF (A) for all
F , A ⊂ F , G, and α ∈ (0, 1). This is sufficient for the linearity of V .
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A.2 Characterization Result
In this section, we assume utility acts: f : S → R+ directly. Also assume that
information cost function c is canonical. Say that ρ is rationalized by (p̄, c) if for each
menu F ∈ K, there exists













ρF (A) = πF
{
p ∈ ∆(S) : A ∩ arg max
f ′∈F
p · f ′ 6= ∅
}
for every A ⊂ F .
The value function of the information acquisition problem defines a rationally
inattentive preference over menus of acts. Such preference has been axiomatized by
de Oliveira et al. (2017).
Definition A.1. (Rationally Inattentive Preference) Say that %∈ K × K is repre-
sented by (p̄, c) if it is represented by












Applying Lemma 1.1, if ρ is rationalized by (p̄, c), then for all menu F ,
∞∫
0












Thus, it is intended to define an induced preference over menus from ρ.
Definition A.2. (Induced Preference over Menus from Stochastic Choice) Given a









A necessary condition for ρ to be rationalizable is that%ρ is a rationally inattentive
preference. Then, we investigate additional conditions that are sufficient for the
rationalizability of ρ.
Say that ρF is continuous at f ∈ F if ρ(F\f)∪(f+r)(F \ f) is continuous at r = 0.
We consider the following axioms on ρ.
Axiom A.1. Domination: If f > g, then ρF (g) = 0 for all F ⊃ {f, g}.
Axiom A.2. Constant Improvement (CI):
If g = f + r for some real number r > 0, then
ρF (f) ≤ 1− ρ(F\f)∪g(F \ f).
Axiom A.3. Generic Independence of Degenerate Decision (IDD):
If ρF is continuous at f ∈ F , then for all act h,
ρF+h((F \ f) + h) = ρF (F \ f).
Axiom A.4. Generic Independence of Never Chosen Act (INCA):
If ρF (g) = 0 and ρF\g is continuous at f ∈ F \ g, then
ρF\g(F \ {f, g}) = ρF (F \ f).
Axiom A.5. ρF ∈ co{limit points of {ρFn} : Fn → F}.
Axiom B5 is a technical condition and weaker than the standard notion of continu-
ity. Again, due to the potential multiplicity of optimal information, slightly adjusting
a menu may cause a discontinuous change in behavior. Axiom B5 adds restriction
on the discontinuity of choice behavior. While the choice may exhibit a “jump”,
the size of that jump cannot be too large. It reflects the fact that the set of optimal
information structures is convex due to the convexity of the information cost function.
Provided that the induced ranking over menus has a rationally inattentive repre-
sentation, Axioms B1-B5 are necessary and sufficient for the stochastic choice to be
rationalized by the rational inattention choice model.
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Theorem A.1. ρ is rationalized by (p̄, c) if and only if %ρ is represented by (p̄, c)
and ρ satisfies Axioms B1-B5.
This result can be understood as a characterization in a dynamic setting. Suppose
that we observe preference over menus % in the first period and stochastic choice
from menus ρ in the second period. There exists unobserved information acquisition
between the two periods. Then % and ρ are jointly rationalized by (p̄, c) if and only
if (i) % is a rationally inattentive preference, (ii) %ρ coincides with %, and (iii) ρ
satisfies Axioms B1-B5.
A.2.1 Proof of Theorem A.1
Lemma A.9. If ρ satisfies CI, then for all menu F , ρF∪r(F ) is weakly decreasing in
r.
Proof. Let r1 > r2. By CI, ρF∪r2(r2) ≤ 1 − ρF∪r1(F ). The assertion is true because
1− ρF∪r2(F ) ≤ ρF∪r2(r2) (recall that the left-hand side is the minimal probability of
choosing r2).
Lemma A.10. Suppose that ρ is rationalized by (p̄, c). The set
{ch(F ) : F ∈ K, I(F ) is a singleton and supp(ρ∗F ) ⊂ {{f} : f ∈ F}}
is dense in Kc.
Proof. The set {ch(F ) ∈ Kc : |I(F )| = 1} is dense in Kc since its complement is of
the first category by Lemma A.5. Thus, for every F ∈ K and ε > 0, there exists Fε
such that d(ch(F ), ch(Fε)) < ε and I(Fε) is a singleton {πFε}. Note that ρ∗Fε must
have a partitioned support; i.e. A∩B = ∅ for all A,B in the support of ρ∗Fε . Too see
this, suppose that under πFε there are two possible posteriors pA and pB that leads
to optimal sets of acts A and B respectively with A ∩ B 6= ∅. Then, we can pool
this two posteriors into one signal, getting a less informative and so weakly cheaper




Hence, π′Fε is also optimal for Fε, violating the fact that πFε is the unique optimal
information.
Now suppose that the support of ρ∗Fε contains a non-singleton element. Without
loss of generality, assume Fε = {f1, f2, f3} and supp(ρ∗Fε) = {{f1, f2}, f3}. Let Gδ =
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{f1 − δ, f2, f3} with δ > 0 small enough such that d(F,Gδ) < ε. Clearly, V (Gδ) ≤
V (Fε). In fact, it must be that V (Gδ) = V (Fε) because 〈Gδ, πFε〉 = 〈Fε, πFε〉. Thus,
πFε is optimal for Gδ. If π
′ 6= πFε is also optimal for Gδ, then it is optimal for Fε
because 〈Fε, π′〉 − c(π′) ≥ 〈Gδ, π′〉 − c(π′) = V (Fε). This contradicts to that I(Fε) is
a singleton. Hence, I(Gδ) is a singleton, and ch(Gδ) is closed to ch(F ). Moreover,
supp(ρ∗Gδ) = {f2, f3}, containing only singleton sets.
Consequently, for every menu F and ε > 0, there exists menu Fε such that




a singleton. The set stated in the Lemma is therefore dense in Kc.
Lemma A.11. Suppose that ρ is rationalized by (p̄, c). Suppose that menu G ∪ t
satisfies that I(G∪ t) is a singleton and t is never tied with any other act in G. Then
ρG∪r(G) is continuous at r = t.
Proof. Let I(G∪t) = {πt}. For each r > t, let πr ∈ I(G∪r) which induces ρG∪r. Since
t is never tied with any other act in G, there is no p ∈ supp(πt) such that 〈G, p〉 = t.
Since πt has finite support, there exist r < t and r̄ > t such that ρG∪t(G) = πt(B+) =
πt(B−) and πt(∂B−) = πt(∂B+) = 0, where B− = {p ∈ ∆S : 〈G, p〉 ≥ r} and
B+ = {p ∈ ∆S : 〈G, p〉 ≥ r̄}.
Since I(·) is a compact-valued and upper hemicontinuous correspondence, as r ↓ t,
the net {πr}r>t has a limit point in I(G∪ t). Without loss of generality, assume that
πr converges to πt. Then limr↓t πr(B+) = πt(B+). Moreover, for r < r̄, B+ ⊂ {p ∈
∆S : 〈G, p〉 ≥ r}, implying that ρG∪r(G) ≥ πr(B+). Hence, limr↓t ρG∪r(G) ≥ ρG∪t(G).
Since ρG∪r(G) is decreasing in r, limr↓t ρG∪r(G) = ρG∪t(G).
Similarly, assume πr converges to πt as r ↑ t. Then limr↑t πr(B−) = πt(B−).
Moreover, for r > r, B− ⊃ {p ∈ ∆S : 〈G, p〉 ≥ r}, implying that πr(B−) ≥ ρG∪r(G).
Hence, ρG∪t(G) ≥ limr↑t ρG∪r(G). Since ρG∪r(G) is decreasing in r, limr↑t ρG∪r(G) =
ρG∪t(G). This completes the proof.
Lemma A.12. If ρ is rationalized by (p̄, c), then %ρ is represented by (p̄, c) and ρ
satisfies Axioms B1-B5.
Proof. Suppose that ρ is rationalized by (p̄, c). By Lemma 1.1, %ρ is represented by
(p̄, c).
Domination: If f > g, then p ·f > p ·g for any p ∈ ∆S. Hence ρF (g) = 0 whenever
F ⊃ {f, g}.
CI: See the proof of Proposition 1.2
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IDD: Take any F and f ∈ F . Suppose that ρF is continuous at f . Note that
I(F ) = I(F + h) for any h. Thus, assume f = t for some t > 0 without loss of
generality. Let G = F \ f . Then ρG∪r(G) is continuous at r = t. We claim that
for any π ∈ I(G ∪ t), ρG∪t(G) = ρπG∪t(G). If not, say, ρG∪t(G) 6= ρπ
′
G∪t(G) where
π′ ∈ I(G ∪ t). Then we can construct another UPC τ which is also rationalized by
(p̄, c) such that τ and ρ agree on all menus except that τG∪t is induced by π
′. But
τG∪r(G) will not be decreasing at r = t. This contradicts to Lemma A.9. Therefore,
for any π, π′ ∈ I(F ), we have ρπF (F \ f) = ρπ
′
F (F \ f) = ρπ
′
F+h((F \ f) + h). This
establishes IDD.
INCA: Suppose that ρF is induced by πF ∈ I(F ). Note that ρF (g) = 0 implies
that 〈F, πF 〉 = 〈F \ g, πF 〉, and ρF (A) = ρπFF\g(A \ g) for all A ⊂ F .
Note that V (F \ g) ≤ V (F ) since a smaller menu always has lower ex-ante val-
uation. However, V (F ) = 〈F \ g, πF 〉 − c(πF ). Hence V (F \ g) = V (F ) and so
πF ∈ I(F \ g). Since F \ g is continuous at f ∈ F \ g, as argued before, for any
π, π′ ∈ I(F \ g), ρπF\g(F \ {f, g}) = ρπ
′
F\g(F \ {f, g}). Therefore ρF\g(F \ {f, g}) =
ρπFF\g(F \ {f, g}) = ρF (F \ f). This establishes INCA.
Axiom B5: By the maximum theorem, I(·) : Kc → Π(p̄) is upper hemicontinuous,
compact-valued, and has a closed graph. Suppose that Fn converges to F and ρFn is
convergent. For each n, let πn ∈ I(Fn) which induces ρFn . By Aliprantis and Border
(2006, Theorem 17.16), {πn} has a limit point in I(F ). Moreover, all its limit points
lie in I(F ) due to the closedness of I. Hence ρFn converges to ρ
π
F for some π ∈ I(F ).
Since I is convex-valued, every πF ∈ I(F ) is a convex combination of all the extreme
points of I(F ). Hence ρF is a mixture of limited choices.
Lemma A.13. ρ is rationalized by (p̄, c) if %ρ is represented by (p̄, c) and ρ satisfies
Axioms B1-B5.
Proof. For all menu F , define












Then V represents %ρ. Let τ be any UPC induced by (p̄, c). By Lemma 1.1,
Vτ (F ) :=
∞∫
0
τF∪r(F )dr = V (F ).
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Since %ρ is represented by V , Vρ(F ) :=
∫∞
0
ρF∪r(F )dr = φ(V (F )) for some mono-




ρb∪r(b)dr = Vρ(b) = φ(V (b)) = φ(Vτ (b)) = φ(b).
The first equality follows from Domination: when r < b, ρb∪r(b) = 1; when r > b,
ρb∪r(b) = 0. So Vρ = V = Vτ .
For any menu F and b ≥ 0, Domination and INCA imply
Vρ(F ∪ b) =
∞∫
0




To see how INCA applies, first note that ρF∪r(F ) is decreasing in r by Lemma A.9.
Thus, it is continuous in r almost everywhere. At each continuous point r > b, since
b is never chosen, ρF∪b∪r(F ∪ b) = ρF∪r(F ) by INCA. Hence
∫∞
b
ρF∪b∪r(F ∪ b)dr =∫∞
b
ρF∪r(F )dr. Similarly,
Vτ (F ∪ b) =
∞∫
0










τF∪r(F )dr for all b ≥ 0. This implies that ρF∪r(F ) =
τF∪r(F ) for almost all r ≥ 0.
Because ρF∪r(F ) and τF∪r(F ) are both decreasing in r by Lemma A.9, they exhibit
jumps at the same points with the same size, and they differ only at those points.
In other words, they have the same continuous points, and they are equal at those
points.
Consider F ∈ K such that I(F ) is a singleton and τF contains no tie. Fix any
f ∈ F . Take act h such that f+h = s for some s > 0. By Lemma B3, τ((F\f)+h)∪r((F \
f) + h) continuous at r = s. Therefore, ρ((F\f)+h)∪r((F \ f) + h) is also continuous at
r = s and ρ((F\f)+h)∪s((F \ f) + h) = τ((F\f)+h)∪s((F \ f) + h). By IDD, ρF (F \ f) =
τF (F \ f). As this is true for all f ∈ F , ρF = τF . By Lemma A.5 the set of all such
F is dense in K. Hence ρ is rationalized by (p̄, c) on a dense subset of K.
Pick any F ∈ K. Let π∗ be an extreme point of I(F ). There exists a sequence of
menus {Fn} and a sequence of information structures {πn ∈ I(Fn)} such that Fn → F
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and πn → π∗. We can choose Fn such that I(Fn) is a singleton and τFn contains no tie.
Thus ρFn = τFn , and ρFn → τπ
∗
F . By Axiom B5, ρF is some mixture of the behaviors
induced by optimal information structures of F . Thus ρF is rationalized by (p̄, c). In
conclusion, ρ is rationalized by (p̄, c).
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Appendix B
Appendix of Chapter 2
B.1 Representation of Betweenness Preference
A betweenness preference has the following representation.
Proposition B.1 (Implicit Expected Utility Representation). A preference over ∆ is
a betweenness preference if and only if there exists u(·, ·) : W × [0, 1]→ R, continuous
in the second argument, such that p % q ⇔ V (p) ≥ V (q), where V (p) is defined




i = vu(w̄, v) + (1− v)u(w, v). (B.1)
Furthermore, u(w, v) is unique up to positive affine transformations which are con-
tinuous in v. A particular transformation exists setting u(w, v) = 0 and u(w̄, v) = 1
for all v ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. See Dekel (1986, Proposition A.1).
B.2 Behavioral Properties of RIEU
For any D,D′ ∈ D and λ, λ′ ≥ 0, let λD + λ′D′ := {λx+ λ′y : x ∈ D, y ∈ D′}. Note
that λD + λ′D′ is also a menu.
For any convex set C, a convex set F ⊂ C is called a face of C if for all x, y ∈ C
and λ ∈ (0, 1),
λx+ (1− λ)y ∈ F ⇒ {x, y} ⊂ F.
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For any set A, let chA denote the convex hull of A. For any D,A ∈ D, we say that
A is a face of D if chA is a face of chD and chA ∩D = A.
Axiom B.1. Monotonicity: ρD(A) ≤ ρD\B(A\B) for all D,A,B ∈ D with A\B 6= ∅.
Monotonicity captures the intuition that the probability of lottery p being optimal
does not decrease as some lotteries are removed from the menu. This property holds
under any random utility model.
Axiom B.2. Extremeness: ρD(A) > 0 implies that A is a face of D, for all A,D ∈ D.
Extremeness states that lotteries p and q are both optimal whenever a mixture
of them is optimal. This property reflects the fact that each indifference set of a
betweenness preference is linear.
Axiom B.3. Stochastic Betweenness: ρλD+(1−λ)p(λA + (1 − λ)p) = ρD(A) for all
p ∈ A ⊂ D ∈ D, λ ∈ (0, 1).
Stochastic Betweenness states that the probability of lottery p being optimal re-
mains unchanged when each other lottery q in the menu is replaced by a mixture of p
and q. This property captures the betweenness axiom, which requires that a mixture
of two lotteries should lie in between them in preference.
Proposition B.2. If ρ is rationalized by RIEU, then ρ satisfies Monotonicity, Ex-
tremeness, and Stochastic Betweenness.
Proof. Suppose that ρ is rationalized by RIEU µ.
Monotonicity: If A = M(D,%), then A \ B = M(D \ B,%). Thus N(D,A) ⊂
N(D \ B,A \ B). It follows that ρD(A) = µ(N(D,A)) ≤ µ(N(D \ B,A \ B)) =
ρD\B(A \B). Hence ρ satisfies Monotonicity.
Extremeness: Suppose that A = M(D,%), where % is a betweenness preference.
Betweenness property implies that p ∼ p′ for all p, p′ ∈ chA, and p  p′′ for all
p ∈ chA and p′′ ∈ chD \ chA. Thus chA = M(chD,%). Suppose that p ∈ chA and
p = λq + (1 − λ)r where λ ∈ (0, 1) and {q, r} ⊂ chD. Since p is optimal, p % q and
p % r. If p  q or p  r, then by betweenness property, p  λq + (1 − λ)r = p, a
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contradiction. Hence p ∼ q ∼ r, implying that q and r are both in chA. Thus chA is
a face of chD. Since A = M(D,%), chA ∩ D = A. Thus A is a face of D and so ρ
satisfies Extremeness.
Stochastic Betweenness: Suppose that p ∈ A = M(D,%), where % is a between-
ness preference. Then for all q ∈ A and r ∈ D \A, p ∼ q and p  r. By betweenness
property, p ∼ λq+(1−λ)p and p  λr+(1−λ)p for all λ ∈ (0, 1). Hence N(D,A) ⊂
N(λD + (1 − λ)p, λA + (1 − λ)p). The argument can be reversed to conclude that
N(D,A) ⊃ N(λD+(1−λ)p, λA+(1−λ)p). Thus ρλD+(1−λ)p(λA+(1−λ)p) = ρD(A).
So ρ satisfies Stochastic Betweenness.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3
We want to show that if two random weighted utilities µ and µ′ agree on the class
E0 := {∩3i=1N({pi, qi}, Ai) : Ai ⊂ {pi, qi} ⊂ ∆ ∀ i = 1, · · · , 3},
then they also agree on the class
E := {∩ki=1N({pi, qi}, Ai) : Ai ⊂ {pi, qi} ⊂ ∆ ∀ i = 1, · · · , k; k ≥ 1}.
This would be true if any E ∈ E can be expressed as E = ∪Mm=1Em, where Em ∈ E0
for all m, and Em ∩ Em′ = ∅ for all m 6= m′.
Consider four pairs of lotteries, (pi, qi) for i = 1, · · · , 4. Let Li denote the line
←→piqi. Each Li divides R2 into two half spaces, H+i and H−i . Without loss of generality,
assume that pi % qi if % rotates at some point in H
+
i clockwise or rotates at some
point in H−i counterclockwise.
We want to show that the set {%: pi % qi ∀ i = 1 · · · , 4} can be decomposed
into finitely many mutually disjoint subsets. Moreover, each subset takes the form
{%: rj  sj ∨ rj ∼ sj ∀ j = 1 · · · , 3}. By induction, we can extend the claim to the
case of more than four pairs of lotteries.
It suffices to show the following: There exist rjk, sjk for j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and k ∈
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{1, · · · , K} such that
∩4i=1{%: pi % qi} = ∪Kk=1
(
∩3j=1{%: rjk % sjk}
)
,
and, for all k 6= k′,
(




∩3j=1{%: rjk′ % sjk′}
)
⊂ {%: r ∼ s}
for some r, s ∈ ∆.
If Li = Lj for some i 6= j, then the claim is trivial. Now assume that Li 6= Lj for
all i 6= j. Without loss of generality, assume that ∩4i=1H+i 6= ∅.
Case 1: ∩4i=1H+i has only 1 one-dimensional face. That is, it is a half space.
Without loss of generality, assume that H+1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ H+4 . Then H−1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ H−4 .
Suppose that p1 % q1 and p4 % q4. Then % either rotates at some point in H
+
1
clockwise or rotates at some point in H−4 counterclockwise. Thus p2 % q2 and p3 % q3.
We have
∩4i=1{%: pi % qi} = {%: p1 % q1} ∩ {%: p4 % q4}.
Case 2: ∩4i=1H+i has two one-dimensional faces. Without loss of generality, assume
that L1 ∦ L2 and ∩4i=1H+i = H+1 ∩H+2 .
Case 2-1: L1 ‖ L2. Then H−1 ∩H−2 = ∅. If p1 % q1 and p2 % q2, then % rotates at
some point in H+1 ∩H+2 clockwise. Thus p3 % q3 and p4 % q4. We have
∩4i=1{%: pi % qi} = {%: p1 % q1} ∩ {%: p2 % q2}.
Case 2-2: L1 ∦ L2 and L3 ‖ L4. Without loss of generality, assume H+3 ⊂ H+4 .
Then ∩4i=1H+i = H+1 ∩H+2 ∩H+4 and ∩4i=1H−i = H−1 ∩H−2 ∩H−4 . Thus
∩4i=1{%: pi % qi} = {%: p1 % q1} ∩ {%: p2 % q2} ∩ {%: p4 % q4}.
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Case 2-3: L1 ∦ L2, L3 ∦ L4, and L1 ∩ L2 ⊂ ∆. If L3 ∩ L4 6⊂ int(H−1 ∩ H−2 ),
then either L3 or L4 is redundant. That is, without loss of generality, ∩4i=1H+i =
H+1 ∩H+2 ∩H+3 and ∩4i=1H−i = H−1 ∩H−2 ∩H−3 . Thus
∩4i=1{%: pi % qi} = {%: p1 % q1} ∩ {%: p2 % q2} ∩ {%: p3 % q3}.
Now, consider L3 ∩ L4 ⊂ int(H−1 ∩H−2 ). Let r ∈ ∆ denote the intersection of L1
and L2. Pick s ∈ ∆ such that ←→rs passes L3 ∩ L4. Note that ←→rs divides H+1 ∩ H+2
into two fans. Let H+5 and H
−
5 denote the half spaces generated by
←→rs such that
H+1 ∩H+2 = (H+1 ∩H+5 ) ∪ (H−5 ∩H+2 ). Without loss of generality, assume that r % s
if % rotates at some point in H+5 clockwise and that H
−


















∩4i=1{pi % qi} = ({p1 % q1} ∩ {p3 % q3} ∩ {r % s})∪({p2 % q2} ∩ {p4 % q4} ∩ {r - s})
Case 2-4: L1 ∦ L2, L3 ∦ L4, and L1∩L2 6⊂ int∆. Without loss of generality, assume
that {p2, q2} ⊂ H+1 . As in the previous case, we shall consider L3∩L4 ⊂ int(H−1 ∩H−2 ).
Pick a lottery r that is a strict mixture of p2 and q2. Pick s1 ∈ ∆ such that←→rs1 ‖ L1.
LetH+5 andH
−
5 denote the half spaces generated by
←→rs1 such thatH+5 ⊂ H+1 . Without
loss of generality, assume that r % s1 if % rotates at some point in H
+
5 clockwise.
Pick s2 ∈ ∆ such that ←→rs2 passes L3 ∩L4. Let H+6 and H−6 denote the half spaces
generated by ←→rs2 such that H+5 ∩ H+2 = (H+5 ∩ H+6 ) ∪ (H−6 ∩ H+2 ). Without loss of
generality, assume that r % s2 if % rotates at some point in H
−
6 clockwise and that
























∩4i=1{pi % qi} = ({p1 % q1} ∩ {p2 % q2} ∩ {r - s1})
∪ ({p2 % q2} ∩ {p4 % q4} ∩ {r % s2})
∪ ({p1  q1} ∩ {p3 ∩ q3} ∩ {r % s1} ∩ {r - s2})
Note that {p1  q1} ∩ {p3 ∩ q3} ∩ {r % s1} ∩ {r - s2} can be decomposed as in Case
2-3.
Case 3: ∩4i=1H+i has three one-dimensional faces. Without loss of generality, assume
that ∩4i=1H+i = H+1 ∩H+2 ∩H+3 , L1 ∦ L2, and L2 ∦ L3.
Case 3-1: L1 ‖ L3 or ∩3i=1H+i is bounded. Note that ∩3i=1H−i = ∅. Thus
∩4i=1{pi % qi} = {p1 % q1} ∩ {p2 % q2} ∩ {p3 % q3}.


















∩4i=1{pi % qi} = {p1 % q1} ∩ {p2 % q2} ∩ {p3 % q3}.
Case 3-3: L1 ∦ L3, L1 ∩ L3 ⊂ H−2 ∩ intH+4 , and [(L1 ∩ L2) ∪ (L2 ∩ L3)] ∩∆ 6= ∅.
Without loss of generality, assume that L2 ∩ L3 ≡ {r} ⊂ int∆. Pick s ∈ ∆ such
that ←→rs passes the intersection of L1 and L4. Let H+5 and H−5 denote the half spaces
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generated by ←→rs such that ∩3i=1H+i = (H+1 ∩H+2 ∩H+5 ) ∪ (H−5 ∩H+3 ). Without loss


























∩4i=1{pi % qi} = ({p1 % q1} ∩ {p2 % q2} ∩ {s % r})
∪ ({p3 % q3} ∩ {p4 % q4} ∩ {r % s}) .
Case 3-4: L1 ∦ L3, L1 ∩ L3 ⊂ H−2 ∩ intH+4 , and [(L1 ∩ L2) ∪ (L2 ∩ L3)] ∩∆ = ∅.
Without loss of generality, assume that {p2, q2} ⊂ H−3 . Let L5 denote the line
passing L2 ∩ L3 and parallel to L1. Note that L5 must intersect ∆ at two points,





5 denote the half spaces generated by L5 such that ∩3i=1H+i =
(H+1 ∩ H+2 ∩ H+5 ) ∪ (H−5 ∩ H+3 ). Without loss of generality, assume that r % s if %


























∩4i=1{pi % qi} = ({p1 % q1} ∩ {p2 % q2} ∩ {s % r})
∪ ({p1 % q1} ∩ {p3 % q3} ∩ {p4 % q4} ∩ {r % s}) .
Note that {p1 % q1} ∩ {p3 % q3} ∩ {p4 % q4} ∩ {r % s} can be decomposed as in Case
2-4.
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Case 4: ∩4i=1H+i has four one-dimensional faces. Without loss of generality, assume
that L1 ∦ L2; L2 ∦ L3 and L2 ∩ L3 ⊂ H+1 ; L3 ∦ L4 and L3 ∩ L4 ⊂ H+2 .
Case 4-1: ∩4i=1H+i is bounded; that is, it is a convex polygon with four edges.
Note that, for at least one diagonal, the line containing it intersects ∆ at more than
one point. Without loss of generality, pick r, s ∈ ∆ such that ←→rs passes L2 ∩ L3
and L1 ∩ L4. Let H+5 and H−5 denote the half spaces generated by ←→rs such that
L3 ∩ L4 ⊂ H+5 . Without loss of generality, assume that r % s if % rotates at some


























∩4i=1{pi % qi} = ({p1 % q1} ∩ {p2 % q2} ∩ {s % r})
∪ ({p3 % q3} ∩ {p4 % q4} ∩ {r % s}) .
Case 4-2: L1 ‖ L4. Let L5 be the line that passes L2 ∩ L3 and is parallel to L1
and L4. Note that L5 intersects ∆ at more than one point. One may pick r ∈ L5
as a mixture of p1 and p4, s ∈ L5 as a mixture of p1 and q4. Then follow the same
argument as in Case 4-1.
Case 4-3: L1 ∩ L4 ⊂ H−2 ∩H−3 . Note that ∩4i=1H−i = H−1 ∩H−4 , i.e., ∩4i=1H−i has
only two one-dimensional faces. We go back to Case 2.
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Appendix C
Appendix of Chapter 3
C.1 Preliminaries
We introduce some terminology and geometric concepts that are used in the paper.
All points and sets are in N -dimensional Euclidean space RN .
For any real-valued function h on RN and set A, let M(A, h) denote the set of
points at which the value of h restricted to A is maximized; that is, M(A, h) = {x ∈
A : h(x) ≥ h(y) ∀y ∈ A}. An affine function h : RN → R is a linear function plus a
translation; that is, h(x) = a · x+ b for some a ∈ RN and b ∈ R.
A set H is a hyperplane if H = Z + x for some (N − 1)-dimensional linear
subspace Z and point x. Two hyperplanes are parallel if their intersection is empty.
Any hyperplane H can be represented by an affine function h as H = {x : h(x) = 0}.
For any sets A and B, say that H supports A at B if B = M(A, h) for some affine
function h that represents H. Say that H separates A and B if instead h > 0 on A
and h < 0 on B.
For any point x, if x =
∑K
k=1 λkxk with λk ≥ 0 for all k, then x is a positive com-
bination of x1, · · · , xK . If in addition
∑K
k=1 λk = 1, then it is a convex combination.
For any set A, let posA (chA) denote the set of all positive (convex) combinations of
points in A. Say that A is convex if A = chA.
A set C is a cone with apex at x if y ∈ C implies that x + λ(y − x) ∈ C for all
λ > 0. Let −C denote the negative of C; that is, z ∈ −C if z = x − λ(y − x) for
some y ∈ C and λ > 0. Let cone(x,A) denote the smallest convex cone with apex at
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x that contains x and A, i.e., cone(x,A) = x+ pos(A− x).
For every p ∈ ∆ and S ⊂ ∆, define
C(p, S) := cone(p, S) ∩∆.
If q′ ∈ ∆, q′ = p+ λ(q − p) for some λ > 0 and q ∈ C(p, S), then q′ ∈ C(p, S). Thus,
we can view C(p, S) as a convex cone restricted to ∆ with apex at p. Similarly, let
−C(p, S) = −cone(p, S) ∩∆.
For any convex set A, a convex subset F is called a face of A if for all x ∈ F and
{y, z} ⊂ A such that x = λy + (1 − λ)z for some λ ∈ (0, 1), {y, z} ⊂ A. When A is
not convex, say that B is a face of A if chB is a face of chA and chB ∩ A = B. A
point x ∈ A is an extreme point of A if {x} is a face of A. For any affine function h,
M(A, h) is a face of A. When A is finite or A = chA′ for some finite A′, every face of
A can be obtained by maximizing some affine function.
The dimension of a set A, denoted by dimA, is the dimension of the affine hull of
A.
For any two subsets A,B of ∆, write A  B (A ∼ B) if p  q (p ∼ q) for all
p ∈ A and q ∈ B \ A.
C.2 Representation
A betweenness preference has the following representation.
Proposition C.1 (Implicit Expected Utility Representation). A preference over ∆ is
a betweenness preference if and only if there exists u(·, ·) : W × [0, 1]→ R, continuous
in the second argument, such that p % q ⇔ V (p) ≥ V (q), where V (p) is defined




i = vu(w̄, v) + (1− v)u(w, v). (C.1)
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Furthermore, u(w, v) is unique up to positive affine transformations which are con-
tinuous in v. A particular transformation exists setting u(w, v) = 0 and u(w̄, v) = 1
for all v ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. See Dekel (1986, Proposition A.1).
C.3 Proof of Theorem 3.1







and αq > 0 for all q ∈ D. Then C(p,D) = M(C(p,A),%).
















where pi ∈ D and βi > 0 for all i = 1, · · · , k. By Betweenness, p ∼ q for all q ∈ D.





×pi. Finally, by Betweenness again, x ∼ p.
Hence, x ∼ x′ for all x, x′ ∈ C(p,D).
















where ri ∈ A and γi > 0 for all i = 1, · · · , l. Since y /∈ C(p,D), for some j, rj /∈ D





× ri. It further implies that p  y.
Consequently, C(p,D) = M(C(p,A),%).
The following is a straightforward implication of Klee (1955, Theorem 2.7).
Lemma C.2 (Separation of Convex Cones). Suppose that C and C ′ are both closed
convex cones in RN with apex at x. Suppose that C∩C ′ = {x}. Then there exists an
affine function h : RN → R such that h < 0 on C\−C, h = 0 on (C∩−C)∪(C ′∩−C ′),
and h > 0 on C ′ \ −C ′.
Lemma C.3. Consider any x ∈ RN and convex set E ⊂ RN . If y ∈ cone(x,E), then
there exists y′ ∈ E such that y′ = x+ λ(y − p) for some λ > 0.
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zi ∈ E. This completes the proof.
Lemma C.4. Let C be a compact cone in RN with apex at x, and let E be a convex
set in RN . If C ∩ E = ∅, then C ∩ cone(x,E) = {x}.
Proof. Obviously, x ∈ C ∩ cone(x,E). Suppose that there exists y ∈ C ∩ cone(x,E)
and y 6= x. By Lemma C.3, there exists y′ ∈ E such that y′ = x + λ(y − x) for
some λ > 0. Since C is a cone with apex at x, y′ ∈ C. Therefore y′ ∈ C ∩ E, a
contradiction. Hence C ∩ cone(x,E) = {x}.







and αq > 0 for all q ∈ D. Suppose that E is a convex set in ∆ and E ∩ C(p,A) = ∅.
Then there exists an affine function h : RN → R such that h < 0 on C(p,A)\C(p,D),
h = 0 on C(p,D), and h > 0 on E.
Proof. Since D is a face of A and p is a strictly convex combination of all points in
D, C(p,A) ∩ −C(p,A) = C(p,D). Note that cone(p, C(p,A)) ∩∆ = C(p,A). Hence
E ⊂ ∆ and E ∩ C(p,A) = ∅ imply that E ∩ cone(p, C(p,A)) = ∅. By Lemma C.4,
cone(p, E)∩ cone(p, C(p,A)) = {p}. Then the proof is completed by Lemma C.2.
Lemma C.6. Suppose that Ĥk is a hyperplane for all k = 1, · · · , K. Let Îk = Ĥk∩∆
and assume that it is nonempty for all k. Suppose that for all k ∈ {2, · · · , K−1}, Ĥk
strictly separates ∪k−1l=1 Îl and ∪Kl=k+1Îl. Then there exists a betweenness preference %
such that (i) if p, q ∈ Îk for some k ∈ {1, · · · , K} then p ∼ q; (ii) if p ∈ Îk and q ∈ Îl
for some k, l ∈ {1, · · · , K} with l > k then p  q.
Proof. For each k ∈ {1, · · · , K}, let hk : RN → R be an affine function such that (i)
hk(x) = 0 for all x ∈ Ĥk, (ii) hk(x) < 0 for all x ∈ ∪K+1l=k+1Îl, and (iii) hk(x) > 0 for all
x ∈ ∪k−1l=0 Îl (let Î0 = ÎK+1 = ∅).
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Pick w̄, w ∈ W that solve maxx∈∆ h1(x) and minx∈∆ hK(x) respectively. Since W
is finite, such w̄ and w exist.
Let {rk} = w̄w ∩ Ĥk. This intersection is nonempty because Ĥ1 separates w̄ and





Then vk ∈ [0, 1] and rk = vkw̄+(1−vk)w. For any k ∈ {2, · · · , K−1}, since Ĥk strictly
separates {w̄}∪ Îk−1 and {w}∪ Îk+1, vk−1 > vk > vk+1. Therefore v1 > v2 > · · · > vK .
For each k, pick ak, bk ∈ R to define function gvk(·) := akhk(·) + bk that satisfies
gvk(w̄) = 1 and gvk(w) = 0. Then for all x ∈ Ĥk,
gvk(x) = gvk(rk) = vkgvk(w̄) + (1− vk)gvk(w) = vk.
Define utility index u(·, vk) : W → R as u(w, vk) = gvk(w) for all w ∈ W .
Take any k and any v ∈ (vk+1, vk). Let rv = vw̄ + (1− v)w. Consider two cases:
Ĥk and Ĥk+1 are either parallel (that is, gvk = gvk+1) or not. In the former case,
let gv ≡ gvk+1 . Note that gv(w̄) = 1, gv(w) = 0, gv(rv) = v, and the hyperplane Hv
represented by gv(x) = v is parallel to both Ĥk and Ĥk+1. In the latter case, let Hv be
the (unique) hyperplane containing {rv} ∪ (Ĥk ∩ Ĥk+1). Note that Hv must separate
∪kl=1Îl and ∪Kl=k+1Îl. Then let gv : RN → R be an affine function such that gv(w̄) = 1,
gv(w) = 0 and gv(x) = v for all x ∈ Hv. In either case, define u(·, v) : W → R such
that u(w, v) = gv(w) for all w ∈ W .
For v ∈ [v1, 1], let gv = gv1 . For v ∈ [0, vM ], let gv = gM . Define u(·, v) : W → R
as before.
Now we have defined a function u(·, ·) : W × [0, 1] → RN . For each v ∈ [0, 1] let
Hv = {x : gv(x) = v}. Note that Hv ∩Hv′ ∩∆ = ∅ for all v 6= v′.
Then we verify that u(·, ·) is an implicit expected utility representation. First
argue that, fixing any w ∈ W , u(w, v) is continuous in v. Note that for all v ∈ [0, 1],
u(w̄, v) = 1 and u(w, v) = 0. Thus, consider w ∈ W \{w̄, w}. Let {v′n}∞n=1 ⊂ (vk+1, vk]
be an increasing sequence converging to v∗ ∈ (vk+1, vk] for some k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , K}
(let v0 = 1 and vK+1 = 0). If Hvk and Hvk+1 are parallel, then gv = gv′ for all
v, v′ ∈ [vk+1, vk] by our construction. Thus gv′n(w) → gv∗(w). Now consider the case
of Hvk ∩ Hvk+1 6= ∅. Without loss of generality, assume that
←→
ww̄ ∩ Hv∗ 6= ∅ and
←→
ww̄ ∩Hv′k 6= ∅ for all k (the argument below is still valid if we exchange the roles of
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w̄ and w). Let {sn} =
←→
ww̄ ∩ Hv′n and {s∗} =
←→
ww̄ ∩ Hv∗ . Then d(s∗, w̄) ≤ d(sn, w̄)
and d(sn, w̄) is decreasing in n (i.e. s
∗ is in between sn and w̄; sn is closer to s
∗ as n
increases). We claim that sn converges to s
∗. If not, there exist ŝ which is strictly in
between s∗ and sn for all n. Let Ĥ be the hyperplane containing {ŝ} ∪ [Hvk ∩Hvk+1 ].
Let {v̂w̄ + (1− v̂)w} = w̄w ∩ Ĥ. Then Ĥ = Hv̂. For all n, since Hv̂ do not intersect
with Hv′n and Hv∗ , v̂ ∈ (v′n, v∗). This implies v∗ = lim v′n ≤ v̂ < v∗, a contradiction.
Thus lim sn = s
∗. Let {tn} =
←→
ww̄∩{x : gv′n(x) = 0} and {t∗} =
←→
ww̄∩{x : gv∗(x) = 0}.
Since by our construction Hv′k and Hv∗ intersect at Hvk ∩Hvk+1 , there exists λ such
that tn − w = λ(sn − x) and t∗ − w = λ(s∗ − x) where {x} is the intersection of
Hvk ∩ Hvk+1 and the affine hull of {w̄, w, w}. Thus tn converges to t∗. Let βn, β∗
be such that w = βnw̄ + (1 − βn)tn = β∗w̄ + (1 − β∗)t∗. Then βn converges to β∗.
Therefore, gv′n(w) = βn → β∗ = gv∗(w). This shows that u(w, v) is left-continuous
for all v ∈ (0, 1]. A similar argument can show that u(w, v) is right-continuous for all
v ∈ [0, 1). Thus u(w, v) is continuous in v for all w ∈ W .
Then we verify that for all p ∈ ∆, there exists a unique v ∈ [0, 1] solving (C.1);
that is, exists a unique v such that p ∈ Hv. First argue that p ∈ Hv for some
v. If p ∈ Îk for some k, then p ∈ Hvk . If p is above Î1 (i.e. h1(p) > 0), then
p ∈ Hgv1 (p). If p is below ÎK (i.e. hM(p) < 0), then p ∈ HgvK (p). Otherwise, there
exist a unique k ∈ {1, · · · , K − 1} such that p is in between Îk and Îk+1; that is
hk(p) < 0 and hk+1(p) > 0. If Ĥk and Ĥk+1 are parallel, then p ∈ Hgvk+1 (p). If Ĥk and
Ĥk+1 intersect, then let H
′ be the hyperplane containing p and Ĥk ∩ Ĥk+1. Then H ′
intersects w̄w at v′w̄ + (1− v′)w for some v′ ∈ [0, 1]. By our construction, H ′ = Hv′
and so p ∈ Hv′ . Hence p ∈ Hv for some v ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, since Hv ∩Hv′ = ∅ for
all v 6= v′, p ∈ Hv for a unique v ∈ [0, 1].
We have verified that u(w, v) is indeed an implicit expected utility, which repre-
sents some betweenness preference %. Note that if p ∈ Îk then p ∈ Hvk . Recall that
v1 > · · · > vM . Hence % satisfies all requirements in the lemma. This completes the
proof.
We start to prove Theorem 3.1.
[(i) ⇒ (ii)]: By Lemma C.1, FK−1  FK , FK = M(BK ,%) and FK−1 =
M(C(pK−1, AK−1),%). These imply FK−1 = M(C(pK−1, AK−1)∪BK ,%). By Lemma C.1
again, FK−1 = M(BK−1,%). Repeating the argument yields Fk = M(Bk,%) for all
k.
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Any indifference set of % is the intersection of a hyperplane and ∆, and all the
worse lotteries lie on the same side of that hyperplane. Therefore Fk is a face of Bk
for all k. Because Fk ∼ Dk and Fk ⊃ Dk = M(Ak,%), Fk ∩ Ak = Dk. For k < l,
because Fk  Fl = M(Bl,%), Fk ∩Bl = ∅.
[(ii)⇒ (i)]: If K = 1 then D is rationalizable by the fact that F1 is a face of B1.
Suppose K > 1. Then dimF1 < N ; otherwise F1 = ∆ and so F1 ∩ Bl = Bl for all l.
Because F1 is a face of B1 and dimF1 < N , there exists a hyperplane H1 supporting
B1 at F1. Let I1 = H1 ∩∆.
Since B2 ⊂ B1 and F1 ∩ B2 = ∅, B2 ∩ I1 = ∅. Since I1 is convex and F2 is a
face of B2, by Lemma C.5 there exists a hyperplane H2 that supports B2 at F2 and
separates I1 and B2 \ F2. Let I2 = H2 ∩∆.
We can repeat this process. Suppose that the hyperplane Hk supports Bk at Fk
and separates ch(∪k−1l=1 Il) and Bk \ Fk. Let Ik = Hk ∩ ∆. Since Bk+1 ⊂ Bk \ Fk,
ch(∪kl=1Il) ∩ Bk+1 = ∅. Since Fk+1 is a face of Bk+1, by Lemma C.5 there exists a
hyperplane Hk+1 that supports Bk+1 at Fk+1 and separates ch(∪kl=1Il) and Bk+1\Fk+1.
Let Ik+1 = Hk+1 ∩∆.
Take any k ∈ {2, · · · , K − 1} and l > k. By our construction, Hk separates
∪k−1i=1 Ii and Bk \ Fk. Since Hl also separates ∪l−1i=1Ii and Bl \ Fl, Hk ∩ Il = ∅. Since
Il ∩ Bl = Fl and Bl ⊂ Bk \ Fk, Hk separates ∪k−1i=1 Ii and Il. Consequently, for any
k ∈ {2, · · · , K − 1}, Hk separates ∪k−1i=1 Ii and ∪Ki=k+1Ii.
By Lemma C.6, we can construct a betweenness preference% under which I1, · · · , IK
are indifference sets and Ik  Il for all k < l. For each k, since Ik ∩ Bk = Fk,
Fk = M(Bk,%). Since Ak ⊂ Bk and Fk ∩ Ak = Dk, Dk = M(Ak,%). For all k < l,
since Ik  Il, Dk  Dl. This completes the proof.
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